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TOO MANY COOKS SPOIL THE SENTENCE: 
FRAGMENTATION OF AUTHORITY IN FEDERAL AND STATE 
SENTENCING SCHEMES 
Rachel A. Mills∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the American federal system, both federal and state courts of-
ten have contemporaneous jurisdiction over a defendant, for related 
or unrelated offenses.  A variety of statutes and procedures enable 
federal and state sovereigns to resolve their charges with the defen-
dant.  The defendant can be tried and sentenced by each sovereign, 
and then will first serve the sentence of the sovereign with primary ju-
risdiction, which belongs to the sovereign that first arrested the de-
fendant.  A problem arises when a judge wishes to impose a consecu-
tive or concurrent sentence with the sentence of another sovereign.
1
 
This Comment focuses on the narrow issue of what the proper 
response is when a federal judge—who sentences first but whose sen-
tence will be served second because the state has primary jurisdic-
tion—orders a consecutive sentence to a yet-to-be-imposed state sen-
tence, and the state judge subsequently intends to give the defendant 
a concurrent sentence.  There are three parts to this problem.  First, 
there is a circuit split regarding whether a federal judge, who sen-
tences first, can mandate that the federal sentence run consecutively 
to the anticipated but yet-to-be-imposed state sentence.
2
  This split re-
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 1 Consecutive sentences are defined as “[t]wo or more sentences of jail time 
served in sequence.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1393 (8th ed. 2004).  Concurrent sen-
tences are defined as “[t]wo or more sentences of jail time to be served simulta-
neously.”  Id. 
 2 Compare United States v. Donoso, 521 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2008), United 
States v. Smith, 472 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 2006), Romandine v. United States, 206 
F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2000), McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 121–22 (2d. Cir. 1998), 
United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038, 1039–40 (6th Cir. 1998), United States v. 
Clayton, 927 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir. 1991), with United States v. Andrews, 330 F.3d 
1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003), United States v. Mayotte, 249 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 
2001), United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57, 59 (10th Cir. 1995), United States v. Bal-
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volves around the ambiguity in 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), which gives fed-
eral courts the discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sen-
tences but does not clearly resolve whether this authority extends to 
circumstances where the federal judge is sentencing first and antic-
ipating another sentence to be imposed by a state court.
3
  Additional-
ly, many state legislatures permit a trial court to order consecutive or 
concurrent sentences, but this does not apply to anticipated sen-
tences that have not yet been imposed.
4
 
Second, the credit and designation authority of the executive 
branch of the federal government, specifically the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP), further exacerbates the problem.
5
  The BOP and state correc-
tions departments can render sentences consecutive or concurrent in 
two ways: (1) by choosing whether to designate the institutions of the 
other sovereign as the place of incarceration for the sentence of its 
sovereign and (2) by choosing whether to credit the sentence served 
by the defendant for the state against the sentence imposed by a fed-
eral judge.
6
  The BOP will sometimes refuse to credit a defendant for 
time served in state custody even when the state judge, sentencing 
second, ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. 
The third and final aspect of the problem is the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction.
7
  Primary jurisdiction belongs to the sovereign that 
first arrested the defendant.
8
  The sovereign with secondary jurisdic-
tion does not lack authority over the defendant; rather its jurisdiction 
is secondary in terms of priority for trial, sentencing, and incarcera-
tion.
9
  The sovereign with secondary jurisdiction can bring the defen-
dant before it through a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
10
 or 
 
lard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993), United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1217 
(5th Cir. 1991). 
 3 See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2006). 
 4 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.16(2) (LEXIS through 2011 Act 141); IOWA CODE § 
901.8 (LEXIS through 2010 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4608(a) (LEXIS 
through 2010 legislation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.115 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Ex-
traordinary Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.026 (LEXIS through 2010 2d Reg. Sess.); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-5 (West 2011);  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-5 (LEXIS through Jan. 2010 
Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.080 (LEXIS through 2011 Reg. & 1st Spec. 
Sess.). 
 5 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3585, 3621(b) (2006).   
 6 See, e.g., id.; FLA. STAT. § 921.16(2) (LEXIS through 2011 Act 141); 730 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-6 (LEXIS through 2011 Act 97-225).  
 7 See, e.g., United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2005); Roche v. Sizer, 
675 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1982).   
 8 See, e.g., Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 9 Id. 
 10 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2006). 
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through a detainer, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detain-
ers.
11
  By bringing the defendant before it, the sovereign with second-
ary jurisdiction does not acquire primary jurisdiction.
12
  The defen-
dant will serve the sentence of the sovereign with primary jurisdiction 
first.
13
 
This Comment argues that the intersection of primary jurisdic-
tion, the federal Executive’s credit and designation authority, and the 
judiciary’s authority to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences 
creates a fragmented system of conflicting authority whereby a de-
fendant may be required to serve consecutive sentences despite the 
fact that the second sentencing judge—the state judge—ordered 
concurrent sentences.  Federal judges and executives may, and some-
times do, ignore the authority of the state sovereign to impose a sen-
tence and to have that sentence carried out.  This violates principles 
of dual sovereignty and comity.
14
 
This Comment argues that the proper effect of the sentencing 
scheme between the state and federal governments, and between the 
branches of each government, should be that if either sovereign or-
ders the sentences to be served concurrently, then the sentences must 
be served concurrently regardless of the order of sentencing.  Each 
sovereign must respect the sentencing authority and discretion of the 
other sovereign to impose a sentence that it deems appropriate in 
light of a variety of factors outlined in its respective sentencing guide-
lines.
15
  If Sovereign A deems the defendant’s service of Sovereign B’s 
sentence satisfactory, Sovereign A should not receive a greater sen-
tence than the sentence that Sovereign A ordered.  This rule would 
promote uniformity, certainty, and fairness in sentencing procedures. 
 
 11 See 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).   
 12 See Taylor, 164 F.3d at 444 n.1. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See, e.g., Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[E]ven if the state 
sentence has been imposed with the expectation that it will be served concurrently 
with a yet-to-be imposed federal sentence, the federal court need not make its sen-
tence concurrent with the state sentence but remains free to make the federal sen-
tence consecutive.” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Sackinger, 704 F.2d 
29, 32 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that under dual sovereignty, a state cannot bind a fed-
eral court sentencing second to concurrent sentences through a plea agreement with 
the defendant); Cozine v. Crabtree, 15 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1012 (D.Or. 1998) (“It would 
be extraordinarily provincial for the United States to assert that federal judges may 
impose sentences that run concurrently with pre-existing state sentences but not the 
other way around.”); Meagher v. Dugger, 737 F. Supp. 641, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1990); 
People v. Chaklader, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
under dual sovereignty, the state court could not bind the federal court’s ability to 
impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence with the existing state sentence). 
 15 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).   
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The difference between concurrent and consecutive sentences 
in practice is significant.
16
  For example, a young woman having a bad 
day goes to a mall in Mississippi and shoplifts.
17
  She shoplifts at fif-
teen different stores.  She is then caught and prosecuted for fifteen 
counts of shoplifting.  She has two previous convictions for shoplift-
ing.  In Mississippi, after two prior shoplifting convictions, the third 
conviction becomes a felony, and the maximum punishment for one 
count of felony shoplifting is five years in prison.
18
  She receives the 
maximum sentences for all fifteen counts.  If she serves the sentences 
for all fifteen counts concurrently, she will serve five years in prison.  
If she serves the sentences consecutively, she will serve seventy-five 
years in prison.  Whether the sentences are consecutive or concur-
rent is significant to this woman and to the prison system, which will 
have to expend more resources to keep her incarcerated for consecu-
tive sentences.  Additionally, although she shoplifted from fifteen dif-
ferent stores, these fifteen counts of shoplifting are essentially all part 
of the same bad act. 
Another example is one “scheme” that results in several crimes.  
Two men plan to bring cocaine into the country from Colombia.  
They successfully get across the border with the drugs, but are ar-
rested by state officials as they attempt to sell it to their friends.  They 
are each charged with conspiracy, drug trafficking, and possession 
with intent to distribute.  The federal authorities learn of this activity 
and charge each of them with the same three crimes under federal 
law.  For the purposes of this example, in both the state and federal 
systems, each of these counts carries a minimum twenty-year sen-
tence.  If the two men are ordered to serve these sentences concur-
rently, they will each serve twenty years in prison.  If they are ordered 
to serve these sentences consecutively, they will each serve one hun-
dred and twenty years in prison, sixty years for the state and sixty 
years for the federal government.  The difference between consecu-
tive and concurrent sentences for each of these men is one hundred 
years.  This example illustrates the implications of criminal activity: 
one single act can violate numerous criminal statutes at both the fed-
eral and state levels.  Whether a sentence is consecutive or concur-
 
 16 See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 174 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 17 In Mississippi, shoplifting is a felony for a third or subsequent conviction of 
shoplifting and carries with it a maximum sentence of five years in prison.  MISS. 
CODE ANN.  § 97-23-93 (LEXIS through 2011 Reg. Sess.).  Additionally, when $500 or 
more worth of merchandise is stolen, shoplifting is a felony that is punished in ac-
cordance with the crime of grand larceny.  Id. 
 18 See id. 
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rent is very significant to defendants and to the criminal justice sys-
tem. 
In order to adequately explain the problems of the current sen-
tencing scheme between the state and federal governments and be-
tween the executive branch and the judiciary, Part II of this Com-
ment highlights the three areas the interaction of which gives rise to 
the problems of fragmented authority: (1) judicial authority at state 
and federal levels to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, (2) 
the credit and designation authority of the BOP, and (3) the concept 
of primary jurisdiction and how both sovereigns are able to contem-
poraneously exercise jurisdiction over the same defendant.  These 
three areas relevant to criminal sentencing create a system whereby 
the federal government with secondary jurisdiction, whether sentenc-
ing first or second, can effectuate consecutive sentences even in the 
face of opposition from the state government, which would prefer 
concurrent sentences.  Part III discusses proposed resolutions and 
advocates for the imposition of a new rule that if a sovereign—state 
or federal—orders a concurrent sentence, the sentence shall be 
served concurrently with any sentences that the defendant is already 
serving or with any future sentence to be imposed for a crime known 
to that sovereign at the time of sentencing.  Concurrent sentences 
should take priority over consecutive sentences because this aligns 
the sentencing practices of the state and federal governments with 
the core principles of the American criminal justice system—that a 
criminal should not receive a greater punishment than is necessary.  
Simultaneously, this new proposed rule preserves each sovereign’s in-
terest in the defendant serving a sentence for his criminal infractions.  
Part IV explains how this result may be effectuated by revising three 
federal statutes and enforced through the existing federal habeas sta-
tutes.  These statutory solutions will provide uniformity, certainty, and 
clarity in the sentencing scheme between the state and federal gov-
ernments. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF FRAGMENTED AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE STATES 
AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The intersection of (1) judicial authority to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences, (2) BOP credit and designation authority, 
and (3) primary jurisdiction creates a problem of fragmented author-
ity in the criminal justice system.  Primary jurisdiction means that the 
defendant will first serve the sentence of the sovereign that initially 
arrested him, but it does not mean that the arresting sovereign will 
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sentence the defendant first.
19
  In some cases, the state arrests a de-
fendant, but the federal government sentences him first.  The federal 
judge, in some instances, may order consecutive sentences even 
though the federal judge sentences first.
20
  By contrast, the state may 
order concurrent sentences,
21
 and in some cases, the defendant may 
have even entered into a plea agreement with the state for concur-
rent sentences.  The defendant, however, could serve consecutive 
sentences because, after serving his state sentence, he would go into 
federal custody, and the BOP may refuse to credit him for his time in 
state custody if the federal judge ordered consecutive sentences.
22
  
Overlapping authority between the state and federal criminal justice 
systems, as well as between the judicial and executive branches, 
creates a situation in some cases in which the federal government 
with secondary jurisdiction sentences first and therefore can effec-
tuate the imposition of consecutive sentences on a defendant, despite 
the fact that the state sentencing second with primary jurisdiction or-
dered concurrent sentences.  This section will explain all these facets 
and discuss how they come together to create this system of frag-
mented authority. 
A. Judicial Authority to Impose Consecutive or Concurrent Sentences 
By 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), Congress vests the authority to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences in the federal courts.  The sta-
tute states: 
If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at 
the same time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a de-
fendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of impri-
sonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively, except 
that the terms may not run consecutively for an attempt and for 
another offense that was the sole objective of the attempt.  Mul-
tiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run con-
currently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the 
terms are to run consecutively.  Multiple terms of imprisonment 
imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court or-
ders that the terms are to run concurrently.
23
 
 
 19 E.g., Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 20 E.g., United States v. Mayotte, 249 F.3d 797, 798 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 21 E.g., id. 
 22 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3584(a), 3585, 3621(b) (2006); Mayote, 249 F.3d at 799. 
 23 § 3584(a). 
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Additionally, state statutes grant state judges the authority to impose 
consecutive or concurrent sentences.
24
 
1. Circuit Split Over § 3584(a) 
The statute governing federal judges, § 3584, does not address 
whether the phrase “multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at dif-
ferent times” includes not-yet-imposed but anticipated state sen-
tences.
25
  This omission has lead to a circuit split.  The Second, 
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held that a federal 
judge may not order consecutive sentences to an anticipated but not-
yet-imposed state sentence, and that the statutory presumptions that 
apply when a federal judge is silent on this issue do not apply if the 
federal judge sentences first.
26
  The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Ele-
venth Circuits hold that a federal judge may order that the federal 
sentence run consecutively to an anticipated but not-yet-imposed 
state sentence and that the presumptions apply when the federal 
judge is silent on the issue, regardless of whether the federal sentence 
is imposed first.
27
  The factual posture in all of the cases forming the 
circuit split is that the federal government—either the judge through 
judicial sentencing authority or the BOP based on the presumptions 
in § 3584(a)—attempted to run the federal sentences consecutively 
to not-yet-imposed state sentences.
28
  In several of these cases, the 
federal court expressly ordered consecutive sentences when sentenc-
ing first, while the state judge ordered concurrent sentences when 
 
 24 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.16(2) (LEXIS through 2011 Act 141); IOWA CODE § 901.8 
(LEXIS through 2010 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4608(a) (LEXIS through 
2010 Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.115 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Extraordinary 
Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.026 (LEXIS through 2010 2d. Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:44-5 (West 2011);  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-5 (LEXIS through Jan. 2010 Legis. 
Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.080 (LEXIS through 2011 Reg. & 1st Spec. Sess.). 
 25 See § 3584. 
 26 E.g., United States v. Donoso, 521 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Smith, 472 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 2006); Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 
738 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038, 1039–40 (6th Cir. 
1998); McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 121–22 (2d. Cir. 1998); United States v. Clay-
ton, 927 F.2d 491, 493 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 27 E.g., United States v. Andrews, 330 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Mayotte, 249 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 
57, 59 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993); 
United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 28 Donoso, 521 F.3d at 145–46; Smith, 472 F.3d at 224; Andrews, 330 F.3d at 1306; 
Mayotte, 249 F.3d at 798; Romandine, 206 F.3d at 732–35; Quintero, 157 F.3d at 1039; 
McCarthy, 146 F.3d at 119–20; Williams, 46 F.3d at 58; Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1504–05; Clay-
ton, 927 F.2d at 492; Brown, 920 F.2d at 1214. 
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sentencing second.
29
  In other cases, the federal judge who sentenced 
first expressly ordered consecutive sentences, and the state judge who 
sentenced second was silent as to concurrency presumably because 
the federal judge had already made the determination.
30
  Additional-
ly, in a majority of these cases, the state government had primary ju-
risdiction while the federal government had secondary jurisdiction.
31
 
a. Circuits Holding that a Federal Judge May Not Impose 
Consecutive Sentences to Not-Yet-Imposed State 
Sentences 
 Five circuits do not allow a federal court to order that its sen-
tence be served consecutively to an anticipated but not-yet-imposed 
state sentence.
32
  In United States v. Donoso, while Donoso was on fed-
eral supervised release after serving time for conspiracy to distribute 
narcotics, he was arrested by state authorities for various narcotic of-
fenses.
33
  After Donoso pled guilty in state court but before being sen-
tenced, he was charged in federal district court for violation of super-
vised release by committing a state crime.
34
  The district court 
sentenced him to twenty-four months and mandated that the sen-
tence run consecutively to the not-yet-imposed state sentence.
35
  The 
next day, the state court sentenced Donoso.
36
  Donoso would serve 
twenty-four months longer if his state and federal sentences were 
served consecutively than he would if they were served concurrently.
37
  
Shortly thereafter, the district court, “sua sponte, recalled the case” 
because the court was unsure of whether it had the authority to im-
pose consecutive sentences to anticipated state sentences.
38
  The dis-
trict court vacated the original sentence under Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 35(a) and reordered the same sentence to ensure that 
 
 29 Mayotte, 249 F.3d at 798; Williams, 46 F.3d at 58; Clayton, 927 F.2d at 492. 
 30 Donoso, 521 F.3d at 145–46; Smith, 472 F.3d at 224; Andrews, 330 F.3d at 1306; 
Romandine, 206 F.3d at 732–35; Quintero, 157 F.3d at 1039; Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1504; 
Brown, 920 F.2d at 1214. 
 31 Donoso, 521 F.3d at 145–46; Romandine, 206 F.3d at 732–35; Quintero, 157 F.3d 
at 1039; McCarthy, 146 F.3d at 119–20; Williams, 46 F.3d at 58; Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502; 
Clayton, 927 F.2d at 492. 
 32 For a list of the circuits and cases, see supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 33 521 F.3d at 145. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 145–46. 
 36 Id. at 146. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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the court’s intent of consecutive sentences was realized.
39
  The 
Second Circuit determined that, as to the first federal sentence, the 
district court did not have the authority to impose consecutive sen-
tences, but held that the court properly used Rule 35(a) to correct 
the sentence.
40
 
 Another example is United States v. Clayton from the Ninth Cir-
cuit.
41
  Clayton was arrested by state authorities and pled guilty in 
state court to second degree burglary and second degree robbery.
42
  
Three days later, Clayton pled guilty in federal court to “making false 
statements in the acquisition of a firearm and possession of a firearm 
by a felon.”
43
  The federal court sentenced Clayton to twenty-four 
months to be served consecutively to any state sentence.
44
  Three days 
later, the state court sentenced Clayton to seventeen months to run 
concurrently with his federal sentence.
45
  If Clayton served his sen-
tences concurrently, he would serve twenty-four months; however, if 
he served his sentences consecutively, he would serve forty-one 
months.
46
  While Clayton was serving the state sentence first, he ap-
pealed, and the Ninth Circuit remanded for Clayton to be resen-
tenced because a federal court could not order a consecutive sen-
tence to a yet-to-be-imposed state sentence.
47
 
 The circuit courts holding that a federal judge may not order 
consecutive sentences to yet-to-be imposed state sentences rely on 
several rationales in support of their position.  The Second, Fourth, 
and Sixth Circuits rely on a textual interpretation of the statute, 
which refers to the imposition of simultaneous sentences or to the 
sentencing of a defendant who is already serving another sentence.
48
  
 
 39 Donoso, 521 F.3d at 146. 
 40 Id. at 149.   
 41 927 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 42 Id. at 492. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Clayton, 927 F.2d at 493. 
 48 United States v. Donoso, 521 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (opining that section 
3584(a) “applies: (1) where multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed at the same 
time; and (2) where a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is al-
ready subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment”); United States v. Smith, 
472 F.3d 222, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plain language of the sen-
tencing statute gives the district court the power to determine whether a sentence 
will run concurrently or consecutively only when a defendant is sentenced to “mul-
tiple terms of imprisonment at the same time” or is “already subject to an undischarged 
imprisonment,” and that this determination cannot be applied to sentences imposed 
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These courts also rely on the legislative history of the statute to de-
termine that the statute applies when a court is sentencing a defen-
dant already subject to a prison term.
49
  Additionally, the Seventh Cir-
cuit advances a common sense rationale, explaining that a sentence 
cannot be concurrent or consecutive to a sentence that does not exist 
or that may exist in the future.
50
  Additionally, these courts express 
 
in the future); McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 121 (2d. Cir. 1998) (holding that the 
presumptions in the last two sentences of section 3584(a) must be read in light of the 
limiting language at the beginning of the section); United States v. Quintero, 157 
F.3d 1038, 1039–40 (6th Cir. 1998).  
To reach our conclusion, we primarily rely on the language of section 
3584(a).  Section 3584(a) only authorizes district courts to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences if the court either imposes mul-
tiple terms of imprisonment on the defendant at the same time or im-
poses a sentence on a defendant who is “already subject to an undi-
scharged term of imprisonment.” . . . We disagree with the Williams 
court’s reading of the final sentence of section 3584(a).  The language 
neither abrogates the requirement that to run consecutively there be 
an undischarged sentence or sentences imposed at the same time nor 
expands a district court’s authority; it establishes a default rule that ap-
plies if a district court fails to specify whether a sentence should run 
concurrently or consecutively and either of the initial two conditions 
are satisfied—“multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a de-
fendant at the same time, or . . . a term of imprisonment is imposed on 
a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of impri-
sonment.” 
Id. 
 49 McCarthy, 146 F.3d at 122 (noting that the Senate Report indicates that the 
drafters of section 3584(a) were referring to the imposition of a federal sentence on 
a defendant who was already serving a state or federal sentence); Clayton, 927 F.2d at 
492. 
The “already subject to” language of section 3584(a) could conceivably 
be interpreted broadly to encompass those defendants found guilty of, 
but not yet sentenced for, a state offense.  However, the legislative his-
tory discussing the section indicates that Congress contemplated only 
that federal sentencing be consecutive to state convictions for which 
the defendant was already sentenced.  In discussing consecutive sen-
tencing under section 3584(a), the legislative history refers to “a term 
of imprisonment imposed on a person already serving a prison term,” 
“imposed while the defendant is serving another one,” and “a person sen-
tenced for a Federal offense who is already serving a term of imprison-
ment for a State offense.”  Thus, as a matter of statutory construction, 
we interpret the “already subject to” provision of section 3584(a) as on-
ly granting federal courts the power to sentence consecutive to a pre-
viously imposed term of imprisonment. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 50 Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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concern for infringement upon state sentencing authority and the 
rights of defendants.
51
 
 Despite ruling that federal judges do not have the authority to 
order that a federal sentence run consecutively to an anticipated state 
sentence, the Seventh Circuit describes the sentencing conflict be-
tween state and federal courts as “illusory” in light of the presump-
tion in the last sentence of section 3584(a), which states that “mul-
tiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run 
consecutively unless the court orders them to run concurrently.”
52
  
Therefore, even if a federal judge sentences first, the sentences will 
automatically be consecutive regardless of the judge’s determination 
because the BOP would follow the statutory presumption when de-
signating the defendant’s place of incarceration.
53
 
b. Circuits Holding that Federal Courts May Impose 
Consecutive Sentences to Not-Yet-Imposed State 
Sentences 
Four circuits allow a federal court to order consecutive sentences 
to yet-to-be imposed state sentences.
54
  In United States v. Andrews, An-
drews, while on federal supervised release from a prior drug sen-
tence, was found in possession of fifty pounds of marijuana and was 
arrested by Mississippi officials.
55
  Andrews subsequently escaped from 
the Mississippi jail after bribing a guard and was arrested in Florida 
months later.
56
  While Andrews’s federal drug and escape charges 
were pending in Mississippi and drug charges were pending in Flori-
 
 51 Clayton, 927 F.2d at 493 (“Such potential difficulties arising from dual sove-
reignty are best avoided if neither sovereign binds the sentencing discretion of the 
other.”). 
 52 Romandine, 206 F.3d at 738.   
 53 Id. at 737–38. 
Neither sec.3584(a) nor any other statute of which we are aware autho-
rizes a federal judge to declare that his sentence must run consecutive-
ly to some sentence that may be imposed in the future. . . . But sen-
tences may well run consecutively by force of law; indeed, the subject 
may simply be out of the judge’s hands.  The final sentence of 
sec.3584(a) reads: “Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at differ-
ent times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are 
to run concurrently.”  A judge cannot make his sentence concurrent to 
nonexistent sentences that some other tribunal may or may not im-
pose; thus the sentence is automatically consecutive. 
Id.; see also infra Part II.B. 
 54 For a list of the circuits and cases, see supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 55 330 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003).  Officials also found an additional fifty-
one pounds of marijuana in Andrews’ home.  Id. 
 56 Id. 
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da, the District Court for the Northern District of Florida sentenced 
Andrews to twenty-four months for violation of supervised release.
57
  
This sentence was to run consecutively to any other sentences An-
drews was serving and to any sentences pending for the criminal con-
duct that constituted the basis of his violation of supervised release.
58
  
Andrews’s incarceration would be twenty-four months longer if his 
federal and state sentences were served consecutively than if they 
were served concurrently.
59
  The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district 
court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence to yet-to-be imposed 
state sentences.
60
 
Another example of a case in which the court reached the same 
conclusion is United States v. Mayotte.
61
  Mayotte was on federal super-
vised release after serving time for bank robbery when he robbed 
another bank, robbed a pizzeria, and would not submit to a urine 
sample, which was a condition of his supervised release.
62
  Mayotte 
was charged in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
for the bank robbery and in Missouri state court for the pizzeria rob-
bery.
63
  The federal court ordered Mayotte to serve forty months for 
the bank robbery consecutively with both his six-month sentence for 
violation of supervised release and with any state sentence that he was 
facing at the time.
64
  The state court later sentenced Mayotte to five 
years for the pizza store robbery to be served concurrently with his 
two federal sentences.
65
  If Mayotte served his federal and state sen-
tences consecutively, he would serve one hundred and six months, 
but if he served them concurrently he would serve sixty months.
66
  
The Eighth Circuit upheld the federal court’s order that Mayotte’s 
federal sentences run consecutively with the pending state sentence.
67
 
The circuit courts that hold that a federal judge may impose a 
concurrent or consecutive sentence to an anticipated but yet-to-be 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1307. 
 61 249 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 62 Id. at 798. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. 
 67 Mayotte, 249 F.3d at 799. 
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imposed state sentence
68
 explain that the plain meaning of section 
3584(a) establishes a preference for consecutive sentencing based on 
the following language: “Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at 
different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the 
terms are to run concurrently.”
69
  The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits 
find support for a federal judge’s authority to impose a consecutive 
sentence to a pending but yet-to-be-imposed state sentence in the 
commentary of the Sentencing Guidelines, which recommends that 
any sentence for violation of supervised release should run consecu-
tively to a sentence imposed for an offense committed while on su-
pervised release.
70
  The Eighth Circuit further relies on the fact that 
federal courts have broad discretion under section 3584(a), which 
does not prohibit district courts from imposing consecutive sentences 
with anticipated state sentences.
71
  The Tenth Circuit likewise relies 
on the broad discretion of the federal courts under section 3584(a).
72
  
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit cites to the language in the second provi-
sion of the statute, section 3584(b),
73
 and opines, “Whether a sen-
tence imposed should run consecutively or concurrently is commit-
 
 68 United States v. Andrews, 330 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003); Mayotte, 249 
F.3d at 799; United States v. Williams, 46 F.3d 57, 59 (10th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 
1217 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 69 Mayotte, 249 F.3d at 799 (“[T]he statute encourages consecutive sentences 
when prison terms are imposed at different times . . . .”); Williams, 46 F.3d at 59 
(“The plain meaning of this provision is that multiple terms of imprisonment im-
posed at different times will normally run consecutively, unless the district court af-
firmatively orders the terms be served concurrently.”); Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1510 (“The 
statute and the analogous Sentencing Guidelines evince a preference for consecutive 
sentences when imprisonment terms are imposed at different times.”). 
 70 Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1506; Mayotte, 249 F.3d at 799 (“[I]t is the Commission’s rec-
ommendation that any sentence of imprisonment for a criminal offense that is im-
posed after revocation of probation or supervised release be run consecutively to any 
term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” (citing U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3 cmt. n.4 (2000))). 
 71 Mayotte, 249 F.3d at 799. 
 72 Williams, 46 F.3d at 59. 
     The plain meaning of this provision is that multiple terms of impri-
sonment imposed at different times will normally run consecutively, 
unless the district court affirmatively orders that the terms be served 
concurrently.  We find no language in section 3584(a) prohibiting a 
district court from ordering that a federal sentence be served consecu-
tively to a state sentence that has not yet been imposed. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 73 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) (2006).  “The court, in determining whether the terms 
imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to 
each offense for which term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth 
in section 3553(a).”  Id.  
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ted to the sound discretion of the district court, subject to considera-
tion of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”
74
  Furthermore, 
 
 74 United States v. Brown, 920 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991) (relying on 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) to hold that the district court could consider anticipated, subse-
quent sentences when exercising its discretion); see also United States v. Ballard, 6 
F.3d 1502, 1504 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that since the defendant committed a 
federal crime purposefully to get the benefit of federal incarceration, allowing him 
to serve his sentences concurrently would not serve the deterrence principles under 
§ 3553(a)(1)(A)–(B), but would instead serve as an incentive). 
Section 3553 reads:  
Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. The court shall im-
pose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply 
with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The 
court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall con-
sider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocation-
al training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines— 
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any 
amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (re-
gardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorpo-
rated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued 
under section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g) [18 USC § 
3742(g)], are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; 
or 
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the 
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States 
Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guide-
lines or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether 
such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing 
Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 
28); 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amend-
ments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless 
of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the 
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 
994(p) of title 28); and 
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these circuit courts take the position that federal courts should not be 
bound by state courts.
75
 
2. State Authority to Impose Concurrent or Consecutive 
Sentences 
 Many state legislatures have given state trial courts the authori-
ty to determine whether sentences run consecutively or concurrently 
with other sentences.
76
  Some state statutes expressly permit state 
courts to order that state sentences run concurrently or consecutively 
with sentences that the defendant may be serving for another state or 
the federal government.
77
  Many of these statutes create default rules 
governing whether a sentence shall be concurrent or consecutive in 
cases in which the state judge is silent on the issue.
78
  Oregon’s statu-
 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g) [18 USCS § 
3742(g)], is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.[;] 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar con-
duct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 75 Mayotte, 249 F.3d at 799 (“To the extent that the federal and state sentences 
conflict, . . . the federal sentence controls.”); Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1509 (explaining that 
it was proper for the federal court to order consecutive sentences when the court was 
sentencing first because a concurrent sentence imposed by a state court would en-
croach on the federal court’s sentencing authority by essentially eliminating a short-
er federal sentence and stating that “[t]he tenet for dual sovereignty purposes is that 
each sovereign must respect not only the sentencing authority of the other, but also 
the sentence.”). 
 76 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.16(2) (LEXIS through 2011 Act 141); IOWA CODE § 
901.8 (LEXIS through 2010 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4608(a) (LEXIS 
through 2010 legislation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.115 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Ex-
traordinary Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.026 (LEXIS through 2010 2d Reg. Sess.); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-5 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.25 (Consol. 2010); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 12-19-5 (LEXIS through Jan. 2010 Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.080 
(LEXIS through 2011 Reg. & 1st Spec. Sess.). 
 77 CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (Deering, LEXIS through 2011 Extraordinary Sess.); 
FLA. STAT. § 921.16 (LEXIS through 2011 Act 141) (only references concurrent sen-
tences); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4608(a) (LEXIS through 2011 1st Extraordinary Sess.) 
(references both concurrent and consecutive sentences in other jurisdictions); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.115 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (references 
only concurrent sentences); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.026 (LEXIS through 2010 2d Reg. 
Sess.) (references only concurrent sentences). 
 78 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (Deering, LEXIS through 2011 Extraordinary 
Sess.); FLA. STAT. § 921.16(2) (LEXIS through 2011 Act 141); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4608 (LEXIS through 2011 1st Extraordinary Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.115 
(LEXIS through 2011 1st Extraordinary Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.026 (LEXIS 
through 2010 2d Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-5 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
70.25 (Consol. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.080 (LEXIS through 2011 Reg. & 1st 
Spec. Sess.). 
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tory scheme has a presumption that sentences run concurrently.
79
  
One exception to Oregon’s concurrency presumption is that, if the 
judge finds that the criminal offenses for which a defendant is 
charged did not arise “out of a continuous and uninterrupted course 
of conduct,” the judge may impose concurrent or consecutive sen-
tences in his discretion.
80
  The second exception to Oregon’s pre-
sumption of concurrency is that the judge may impose consecutive 
sentences even if the sentences arise from the same course of con-
duct if the judge finds 
(a) That the criminal offense . . . was an indication of defendant’s 
willingness to commit more than one criminal offense; or (b) The 
criminal offense . . . caused or created a risk of causing greater or 
qualitatively different loss, injury or harm to the victim or . . . to a 
different victim . . . .
81
 
Similarly, California’s statutory scheme shows a preference for con-
current sentences.
82
  The statutory scheme does not, however, give a 
state judge the authority to order a consecutive or concurrent sen-
tence to a yet-to-be-imposed federal or state sentence.
83
  Whether or 
 
 79 OR. REV. STAT. § 137.123(4) (LEXIS through 2009 Leg. Sess.). 
 80 Id. 
 81 § 137.123(5). 
 82 CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (Deering, LEXIS through 2011 Extraordinary Sess.) 
(“Upon the failure of the court to determine how the terms of imprisonment on the 
second or subsequent judgment shall run, the term of imprisonment on the second 
or subsequent judgment shall run concurrently.”); see also In re Altstatt, 38 Cal. Rptr. 
616, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (stating, in reference to section 669, that “[i]n statutory 
construction, the interpretation resulting in concurrent sentences is favored.”). 
 83 See, e.g., § 669. 
When any person is convicted of two or more crimes, whether in the 
same proceeding or court or in different proceedings or courts, and 
whether by judgment rendered by the same judge or by different 
judges, the second or other subsequent judgment upon which sentence 
is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of imprison-
ment or any of them to which he or she is sentenced shall run concur-
rently or consecutively. 
Id.  The principle that a state court cannot preemptively bind a federal judge’s exer-
cise of sentencing authority is widely accepted.  E.g., Hawley v. United States, 898 
F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Because of the division of power between the fed-
eral government and the states under dual sovereignty principle of our form of gov-
ernment, a defendant may not, by agreement with state authorities, compel the fed-
eral government to impose a sentence that is concurrent with an existing state 
sentence.”); Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Further, even if the 
state sentence has been imposed with the expectation that it will be served concur-
rently with a yet-to-be imposed federal sentence, the federal court need not make its 
sentence concurrent with the state sentence but remains free to make the federal 
sentence consecutive.”); United States v. Sackinger, 704 F.2d 29, 32  (2d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that under dual sovereignty, a state cannot bind a federal court that sen-
tences second to concurrent sentences through a plea agreement with the defen-
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not these statutes would be susceptible to the interpretation of the 
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits does not appear to be at 
issue in these cases because state courts do not even presume to bind 
the federal government.
84
 
B. The Bureau of Prisons’ Designation and Credit Authority 
 The federal government’s power to designate the institution of 
a defendant’s incarceration resides with the Attorney General, but 
the Code of Federal Regulations expressly delegates this power to the 
BOP.
85
  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), Congress gives the BOP the 
authority to designate “any available penal or correctional facility that 
meets minimum standards of health and habitability established by 
the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise,” as 
the place of incarceration,
86
 thereby including both state and federal 
 
dant); Meagher v. Dugger, 737 F. Supp. 641, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1990); People v. Chaklad-
er, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that under dual sove-
reignty, the state court could not bind the federal court’s ability to impose a concur-
rent or consecutive sentence to an existing state sentence). 
 84 See, e.g., Hawley, 898 F.2d at 1514; Pinaud, 851 F.2d at 30; Sackinger, 704 F.2d at 
32; Meagher, 737 F. Supp. at 646; Chaklader, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347. 
     Although these cases do not specifically reference the Supremacy Clause, their 
assertion that a state court may not bind a federal court may rest in part on the Su-
premacy Clause, which underlies the United States’ system of federalism.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, 
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Id.   
 85 28 C.F.R. § 0.96 (2011). 
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is authorized to exercise or per-
form any of the authority, functions, or duties conferred or imposed 
upon the Attorney General by any law relating to the commitment, 
control, or treatment of persons (including insane prisoners and juve-
nile delinquents) charged with or convicted of offenses against the 
United States . . . . 
Id. 
 86 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
Place of imprisonment. The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place 
of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any availa-
ble penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of 
health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained 
by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without 
the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau 
determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering –  
(1) the resources of the facility contemplated; 
(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense; 
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institutions.  According to 18 U.S.C. § 3585, the Attorney General, 
through the BOP, may choose to give a defendant credit for prior 
custody.
87
  It is the Executive, through the Attorney General and the 
BOP, who has the ability to make crediting decisions, not the judi-
ciary through the district courts.
88
  Through the intersection of sec-
 
(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner; 
(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence— 
(A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprison-
ment was determined to be warranted; or 
(B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appro-
priate; and 
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28. 
In designating the place of imprisonment or making transfers under 
this subsection, there shall be no favoritism given to prisoners of high 
social or economic status. The Bureau may at any time, having regard 
for the same matters, direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal 
or correctional facility to another. The Bureau shall make available ap-
propriate substance abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau de-
termines has a treatable condition of substance addiction or abuse. Any 
order, recommendation, or request by a sentencing court that a con-
victed person serve a term of imprisonment in a community correc-
tions facility shall have no binding effect on the authority of the Bureau 
under this section to determine or change the place of imprisonment 
of that person. 
Id. 
 87 Id. § 3585. 
Calculation of a term of imprisonment  
(a) Commencement of sentence. A sentence to a term of imprison-
ment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody 
awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service 
of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to 
be served. 
(b) Credit for prior custody. A defendant shall be given credit toward 
the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in offi-
cial detention prior to the date the sentence commences— 
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was ar-
rested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence 
was imposed; 
that has not been credited against another sentence. 
Id.   
 88 United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333–35 (1992). 
     We do not accept Wilson’s argument that § 3585(b) authorizes a 
district court to award credit at sentencing. Section 3585(b) indicates 
that a defendant may receive credit against a sentence that “was im-
posed.” It also specifies that the amount of the credit depends on the 
time that the defendant “has spent” in official detention “prior to the 
date the sentence commences.” Congress’ use of a verb tense is signifi-
cant in construing statutes.  By using these verbs in the past and 
present perfect tenses, Congress has indicated that computation of the 
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tion 3621(b) and section 3585, the federal executive branch may ef-
fectuate consecutive sentences even when a state judge who sentences 
second orders concurrent sentences.
89
 
 The BOP is under no obligation to consider the state judge’s 
order as to consecutive or concurrent sentences.
90
  Even when a state 
court with primary jurisdiction
91
 sentences second and orders a con-
current sentence, the BOP can allow the defendant to remain in state 
custody for the duration of his state sentence.
92
  The BOP can lodge a 
detainer with state officials requesting that the defendant’s custody 
be transferred to federal authorities after he has fulfilled his state ob-
ligations.
93
  Once the defendant is in federal custody, the defendant 
can make a nunc pro tunc
94
 request to receive credit on the federal 
sentence for the time served in the state institution so that the sen-
 
credit must occur after the defendant begins his sentence.  A district 
court, therefore, cannot apply § 3585(b) at sentencing. 
. . . .  
     After a district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney 
General, through the BOP, has the responsibility of administering the 
sentence.  To fulfill this duty, BOP must know how much of the sen-
tence the offender has left to serve.  Because the offender has a right to 
certain jail-time credit under § 3585(b), and because the district court 
cannot determine the amount of crediting at sentencing, the Attorney 
General has no choice but to make the determination as an administra-
tive matter when imprisoning the defendant. 
Id.  (internal citations omitted); see also Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (regard-
ing the statutory construction of verb tenses discussed by the Supreme Court in Wil-
son). 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context 
indicates otherwise-- words importing the singular include and apply to 
several persons, parties, or things; words importing the plural include 
the singular; words importing the masculine gender include the femi-
nine as well; words used in the present tense include the future as well 
as the present . . . . 
Id. 
 89 See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
how the Executive, through authority granted under section 3621(b), can override 
the section 3584(a) presumption of consecutive sentences for sentences imposed at 
different times and make them concurrent in practical effect and stating that “the 
effective decision then is made by the Attorney General . . . rather than the federal 
judge”). 
 90 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3585, 3621(b) (2006); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 
483–84 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 91 The defendant will serve the state sentence first regardless of the order of the 
imposition of sentences because the state court has primary jurisdiction.  See infra 
Part II.C. 
 92 See, e.g., §§ 3585, 3621(b); Barden, 921 F.2d at 483–84. 
 93 See Barden, 921 F.2d at 478. 
 94 Black’s Law Dictionary defines nunc pro tunc as “[h]aving retroactive legal effect 
through a court’s inherent power.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (8th ed. 2004). 
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tences would be concurrent.
95
  The BOP has broad discretion
96
 under 
section 3621(b)
97
 and may deny this request, thereby ignoring the 
state sentence altogether even though the state judge sentenced last.
98
  
This may be especially important when a defendant has entered a 
guilty plea with that state pursuant to a plea agreement that provides 
for a state sentence to run concurrently with the federal sentence im-
posed first.
99
  Despite this plea agreement and despite the fact that 
the state may have sentenced second, the defendant would still have 
to serve consecutive sentences because the BOP refused to give the 
defendant credit for his state service.
100
  The broad discretion given to 
the federal Executive in section 3621(b) enables the BOP to effec-
tuate consecutive sentences when the federal government has sec-
ondary jurisdiction regardless of what the state judge mandates and 
regardless of the sentencing order.
101
 
C. State and Federal Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction 
 Primary jurisdiction, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 
and writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum enable a defendant to 
serve a state sentence, although imposed second, before a federal 
sentence.  When an individual is first arrested, the sovereign that ar-
rested him has what is known as “primary jurisdiction” over the de-
fendant.
102
  If another sovereign also intends to charge the defendant, 
 
 95 See Barden, 921 F.2d at 478; McCarthy v. Doe, 146 F.3d 118, 119–20 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 96 McCarthy, 146 F.3d at 123; see also Barden, 921 F.2d at 483–84. 
 97 Section 3621(b), which applies to commitments after November 1, 1987, re-
placed 18 U.S.C.A. § 4802(b) (West 1985), repealed by Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984, ch. 58, § 218(a), 98 Stat. 2027, which applied to commitments prior to 
November 1, 1987 and gave wide discretion to the Attorney General in determining 
the place of a prisoner’s confinement.  See Barden, 921 F.2d at 481–82 (explaining 
similarities between the two statutes, although section 4082(b) was the statute at issue 
for Barden). 
 98 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006); Barden, 921 F.2d at 483.   
 99 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 100 See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2000) (“By refus-
ing to make this designation [the state institution as the place of federal confine-
ment], and by instead lodging a detainer with state officials, the Attorney General 
can ensure consecutive service . . . .”). 
 101 See, e.g., Del Guzzi v. United States, 980 F.2d 1269, 1272–73 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(Norris, J., concurring) (“[C]oncurrent sentences imposed by state judges are noth-
ing more than recommendations to federal officials [because federal] officials re-
main free to turn those concurrent sentences into consecutive sentences by refusing 
to accept the state prisoner until the completion of the state sentence and refusing to 
credit the time the prisoner spent in state custody.”).  
 102 HENRY J. SADOWSKI, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INTERACTION OF FEDERAL AND STATE 
SENTENCES WHEN DEFENDANT IS UNDER STATE PRIMARY JURISDICTION (2006), available at 
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that sovereign is able to do so even while the defendant is in the cus-
tody of the first sovereign.
103
  For purposes of trial, sentencing, and 
incarceration, the sovereign with primary jurisdiction has “priority of 
custody” over the second sovereign.
104
  The second sovereign does not 
lack jurisdiction over the defendant but merely lacks priority of cus-
tody over the defendant.
105
 
Primary jurisdiction also refers to the sequence in which the de-
fendant serves his sentences.
106
  The rule for sequencing mandates 
that the sentence imposed by the primary-jurisdiction sovereign be 
served first.
107
  Either the primary-jurisdiction sovereign or the sec-
ondary-jurisdiction sovereign may sentence the defendant first with-
out affecting primary jurisdiction.
108
  A sovereign relinquishes primary 
jurisdiction to the other sovereign by dismissing the charges, releas-
ing the defendant on bail or parole, or upon the expiration of that 
sovereign’s sentence.
109
  A less common mechanism for releasing 
primary jurisdiction used in some federal jurisdictions is the execu-
tive waiver.
110
  The executive waiver is a discretionary function of the 
executive branch by which the Executive may relinquish priority of 
jurisdiction to the secondary jurisdiction even though the sovereign 
who grants the waiver arrested the defendant first.
111
  Although ex-
ecutive waivers have not been considered in all jurisdictions, they 
 
www.bop.gov/news/ifss.pdf; see also United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 
2005) (“As between the state and federal sovereigns, primary jurisdiction over a per-
son is generally determined by which one first obtains custody of, or arrests, the per-
son.”); United States v. Vann, 207 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (“The control-
ling factor in determining the power to proceed as between two contesting 
sovereigns is the actual, physical custody of the accused.”).  The origin of the current 
usage of the term of art “primary jurisdiction” is unclear. 
 103 See Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 444 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id; see also Roche v. Sizer, 675 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684–85 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 
368, 371 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 106 SADOWSKI, supra note 102.  
 107 Id.  
 108 See id. 
 109 Id.; see also United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Primary 
jurisdiction continues until the first sovereign relinquishes its priority in some way.  
Generally, a sovereign can only relinquish primary jurisdiction in one of four ways: 1) 
release on bail, 2) dismissal of charges, 3) parole, or 4) expiration of sentence.”); 
Roche, 675 F.2d at 510 (holding that the federal court relinquished primary jurisdic-
tion by releasing the prisoner on bail). 
 110 See Savvas Diacosavvas, Note, Penal Law: Vertical Conflicts in Sentencing Practices: 
Custody, Credit, and Concurrency, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 207, 218 (2000). 
 111 United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684–85 (9th Cir. 1980). 
MILLS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2011  1:46 PM 
1658 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1637 
have been upheld by the Ninth Circuit and some federal district 
courts in New York.
112
 
The sovereign with primary jurisdiction can loan the defendant 
to the sovereign with secondary jurisdiction so that the defendant can 
face charges without the sovereign sacrificing primary jurisdiction.
113
  
A defendant can be borrowed by lodging a detainer pursuant to the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers of 1970 or by filing a writ of ha-
beas corpus ad prosequendum.
114
  The Interstate Agreement on Detain-
ers and writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum provide procedures 
through which a sovereign with secondary jurisdiction can borrow a 
defendant to charge him and settle other matters.
115
 
The Interstate Agreement is a compact entered into by “States,” 
which includes both an individual state of the United States and the 
United States of America collectively.
116
  The Interstate Agreement 
specifies a procedure for the sovereign with primary jurisdiction to 
loan a prisoner to another member State that does not have primary 
jurisdiction prior to the completion of the prisoner’s obligations to 
the primary jurisdiction.
117
  The sovereign with secondary jurisdiction 
has to lodge a detainer with the primary-jurisdiction sovereign in-
forming the primary-jurisdiction sovereign that the defendant is 
wanted by another sovereign.
118
  This lending procedure does not af-
 
 112 See id.; see also United States v. Gonzalez, No. S-1 94 Cr. 313, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15300, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998); Shumate v. United States, 893 F. Supp. 
137, 141–42 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Warren, 610 F.2d at 684) (upholding the execu-
tive waiver against a challenge by the BOP).  
 113 Cole, 416 F.3d at 897. 
If, while under the primary jurisdiction of one sovereign, a defendant is 
transferred to the other jurisdiction to face a charge, primary jurisdic-
tion is not lost but rather the defendant is considered to be “on loan” 
to the other sovereign.  This comports with the principles that ordinari-
ly apply when two separate sovereigns exercise jurisdiction over the 
same person during the same time period. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 114 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2006); 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006). 
 115 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5); 18 U.S.C. app. § 2; see also United States v. Mauro, 436 
U.S. 340, 358, 361 (1978); Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d 1059, 1061–62  (7th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Smith, 812 F. Supp. 368, 371 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); SADOWSKI, supra 
note 102. 
 116 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. II (a). 
 117 § 2, art. IV, V. 
 118 Id.; see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343–44 (1978). 
In 1970 Congress enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 
18 U. S. C. App., pp. 1395–1398 (1976 ed.), joining the United States 
and the District of Columbia as parties to the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers (Agreement).  The Agreement, which has also been enacted 
by 46 States, is designed “to encourage the expeditious and orderly 
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fect the primary jurisdiction of the lending sovereign.
119
  Additionally, 
the lodging of the detainer does not transfer custody
120
 or begin the 
sentence imposed by the sovereign with secondary jurisdiction.
121
 
Writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum are similarly used by fed-
eral authorities with secondary jurisdiction to obtain a defendant be-
fore the defendant has fulfilled his obligations to the state sovereign 
with primary jurisdiction.
122
  The sentence of the secondary-
 
disposition of . . . charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and deter-
mination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried 
indictments, informations, or complaints.” Art. I. It prescribes proce-
dures by which a member State may obtain for trial a prisoner incarce-
rated in another member jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may 
demand the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against him 
in another jurisdiction. In either case, however, the provisions of the 
Agreement are triggered only when a “detainer” is filed with the cus-
todial (sending) State by another State (receiving) having untried 
charges pending against the prisoner; to obtain temporary custody, the 
receiving State must also file an appropriate “request” with the sending 
State. 
Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343–44. 
 119 § 2, Art. V(g) (“For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody 
as provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in 
the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending State . . . .”). 
 120 § 2, Art. V; Thomas v. Whalen, 962 F.2d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A detainer 
neither effects a transfer of a prisoner from state to federal custody nor transforms 
state custody into federal custody by operation of law.”); see also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 
358–59. 
 121 § 2, Art. V; Thomas, 62 F.2d at 363 (stating that a prisoner’s federal sentence 
does not begin until after he has completed his state sentence and is transferred to 
the federal authorities for service of the federal sentence); Larios v. Madigan, 299 
F.2d 98, 99–100 (9th Cir. 1962). 
 122 The power to grant a writ of habeas corpus was recognized by Congress in sec-
tion 14 the Judiciary Act of 1789,  ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (1789). 
That all the before mentioned courts of the United States shall have 
the power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus, and all other writs, not spe-
cifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exer-
cise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles 
and usages of law. . . .  Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no 
case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody un-
der or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed 
for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought 
into court to testify. 
Id.  The All Writs Act, which is the modern version of section 14 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, states, “The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress 
may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 
(2006).  The use of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was officially codified 
in 1948.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2006); see also United States v. Ratcliff, No. CR. 
A. 98-300, 2001 WL 910402, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2001) (discussing a situation in 
which a defendant in state custody appeared before the federal court for sentencing 
on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 
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jurisdiction sovereign, the federal government, does not begin to run 
when the defendant is produced pursuant to the writ;
123
 primary ju-
risdiction is retained by the primary sovereign, the state, when the de-
fendant is borrowed by the federal government.
124
  Through the writ, 
in some cases, the federal sovereign with secondary jurisdiction is 
able to sentence the defendant before the state sovereign with prima-
ry jurisdiction has done so.
125
  For example, a state may arrest and 
charge a defendant, and the defendant may plead guilty to those 
charges.  The federal government may also bring charges against the 
defendant while the defendant is in a state facility.  The federal gov-
ernment can file a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to bring the 
defendant before a federal court for hearings, trial, sentencing, etc.  
The defendant would serve his state sentence first, but the federal 
government, through the writ, may be able to sentence the defendant 
before the state. 
The main difference between the writ and the Interstate Agree-
ment is that the detainer, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement, is a 
notification to the sovereign with primary jurisdiction that the pris-
oner is wanted by another sovereign and that the prisoner should be 
transferred when the prisoner’s obligations to the primary-
jurisdiction sovereign are fulfilled,
126
 while the writ compels tempo-
rary custody at a specified time.
127
  Additionally, while the federal gov-
ernment may utilize both mechanisms, a state may only request the 
presence of a defendant who is in federal custody at the time through 
the detainer.
128
   
 
1999) (“[A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is]used in criminal cases to bring 
before a court a prisoner to be tried on charges other than those for which the pris-
oner is currently being confined.”); SADOWSKI, supra note 102. 
 123 Del Guzzi v. United States, 980 F.2d 1269, 1270 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining 
that an inmate’s federal sentence does not begin to run until he is returned to feder-
al prison to serve the balance of his federal sentence). 
 124 Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d 1059, 1062 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999) (describing the 
process of “borrowing” a defendant under the writ); SADOWSKI, supra note 102. 
 125 SADOWSKI, supra note 102.  
 126 Diacosavvas, supra note 110, at 216; see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 
340, 358 (1978). 
 127 Diacosavvas, supra note 110, at 216; see also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 358. 
 128 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2006); 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).  The power of the 
writ is found in a federal statute governing federal courts and does not give states the 
authority to use the writ.  In fact, the Supreme Court in Tarble’s Case specifically held 
that states lack the authority to use writs of habeas corpus for prisoners held by 
another sovereign, including the United States.  80 U.S. 397, 405 (1872) (“[N]o State 
can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas corpus or 
otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent government.”).  The 
power of the detainer is found in a compact between the states and the federal gov-
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Essentially, primary jurisdiction, the writ, and the Interstate 
Agreement mean that the defendant would first serve the sentence of 
the sovereign who arrested him first, but that the sovereign with sec-
ondary jurisdiction may or may not sentence him first.  Therefore, 
the defendant could potentially serve the sentence he was given last 
prior to serving the sentence he was given first. 
D. The Current System Enables the Federal Government, with 
Secondary Jurisdiction, to Effect Consecutive Sentences over the 
State’s Objection when the State Sentences Last 
 The interaction of primary jurisdiction, judicial authority to 
impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, and BOP designation 
and credit authority makes it possible for a defendant to serve con-
secutive sentences even when a state judge sentencing second orders 
concurrent sentences.  The defendant would serve the primary-
jurisdiction sovereign’s sentence first.
129
  Under section 3584(a), a 
federal judge can order a consecutive or concurrent sentence to an 
existing state sentence (or yet-to-be-imposed state sentence, depend-
ing on the circuit).
130
  The following hypothetical
131
 illustrates that the 
interaction of primary jurisdiction, judicial authority to impose con-
secutive or concurrent sentences, and the BOP’s designation and 
credit authority in some cases
132
 enables the federal government to 
effectuate consecutive sentences for a defendant over the objection 
of the state court, which sentenced last.  In this hypothetical, the fed-
eral judge sentences first, has secondary jurisdiction, and orders con-
secutive sentences.
133
  The state judge who sentences second can or-
der consecutive or concurrent sentences to an existing federal 
sentence.
134
  Thus, the state judge sentences second, has primary ju-
risdiction, and orders concurrent sentences.  After the defendant 
serves the state sentence, the federal BOP decides whether or not to 
 
ernment, and therefore, both the state and the federal government may use a de-
tainer. 
 129 See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text. 
 130 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 131 The facts of this hypothetical are consistent with the factual posture of the cas-
es giving rise to the circuit split.  See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 132 The scenario discussed in this Comment is not what always happens when the 
federal and state governments contemporaneously exercise jurisdiction over the 
same defendant.  Often times, the issues discussed in this Comment do not arise.  
This Comment focuses on the situation when the federal government, with second-
ary jurisdiction, sentences first and imposes consecutive sentences over the objection 
of the state government, which has primary jurisdiction and sentences second.   
 133 See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2006); supra Part II.A. 
 134 See supra Part II.A.2. 
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credit the defendant with the time served in state custody.
135
  The 
BOP may decide not to credit the defendant with the time served in 
state custody.
136
  Under this scenario, the BOP can effectuate consecu-
tive sentences despite the fact that the state judge sentencing last or-
dered concurrent sentences and despite the fact that the defendant 
may have entered into a plea agreement with the state, under which 
concurrent sentences were part of the arrangement.
137
 
1. The Current Regime Creates a System of Manipulation 
The current criminal justice regime with authority fragmented 
between the state and federal governments leads to a system of gam-
ing among sovereigns, whereby the state sovereign would try to lose 
primary jurisdiction to effectuate the sentence that the state sove-
reign deems appropriate.  State and federal judges can relinquish 
primary jurisdiction by releasing the defendant on bail.
138
  This could 
potentially lead to a “game of chicken”
139
 between the federal and 
 
 135 See supra notes 85–101 and accompanying text. 
 136 See supra notes 89–101 and accompanying text. 
 137 See, e.g., Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 477–78 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that a 
state court with primary jurisdiction intended concurrent sentences, but that the 
BOP had discretion to determine that the defendant’s federal sentence did not be-
gin until the defendant arrived in the federal facility for service of the federal sen-
tence). 
 138 See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 139 For a discussion on the theory of the “game of chicken,” see David Crump, 
Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
331, 368–73 (2001). 
In the game called “Chicken,” two cars race toward each other.  The 
first driver to turn is a chicken.  If neither has a sufficient instinct for 
self-preservation, the cars collide head-on, killing both. . . .  [T]he 
worst possible outcome is for neither player to be chicken, so that the 
result is a head-on collision, killing both . . . .  Thus, it has been ob-
served that cantankerousness, anger, and recklessness can be successful 
strategies in negotiation. So can a “lock-in” or commitment strategy, by 
which a player ostentatiously binds himself or herself to a potentially 
self-destructive course of action, which encourages the other player to 
give in to avoid the same disastrous result for both.  It follows that the 
mere appearance of cantankerousness, anger, or irrationality, or the 
credible communication of a “lock-in” or commitment strategy, can be 
effective.  Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited the United Nations 
during the heyday of the Cold War, where in addition to his belligerent 
rhetoric, he interrupted a delegate’s speech by taking off his shoe and 
banging it on the table.  The Soviet Union was a nuclear power, but 
Khrushchev’s action implied that it was headed by a maniac who did 
not care about consequences.  This strategy works quite well in the 
game of Chicken, provided only that the exploiter is skillful at commu-
nicating it convincingly to another player who is rational. 
Id. at 368–70. 
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state authorities—where either sovereign may release an extremely 
dangerous defendant on bail on the assumption that the other sove-
reign will collect him.  State authorities with primary jurisdiction may 
also transfer a defendant to the federal authorities to effectuate con-
current sentences even though the defendant may not have yet com-
pleted the state sentence.
140
  If the state, which has primary jurisdic-
tion, were to make a transfer to the federal authorities, who have 
secondary jurisdiction, to effectuate concurrent sentences, then the 
state may be able to lodge a detainer to bring the defendant back in 
state custody to serve any remaining time on the state sentence after 
the completion of the federal sentence.
141
  In response to this, the 
federal sovereign may be able to refuse to take custody of the defen-
dant until the defendant is eligible for parole on the state sentence.
142
  
Rather than forcing the state to use complex manipulation tactics to 
effectuate a concurrent sentence when the state court with primary 
jurisdiction has sentenced last, the system should be improved to 
promote uniformity, predictability, and justice. 
 
 140 Clark v. State, 468 S.E.2d 653, 655 (S.C. 1996). 
The determination by federal authorities that a defendant’s federal 
sentence runs consecutive to his or her state sentence is a federal mat-
ter which cannot be overridden by a state court provision for concur-
rent sentencing on a subsequently obtained state court conviction.  Al-
though a state trial judge may properly order the sentences which he 
or she imposes to run concurrently, or consecutively, to each other, a 
state court is without authority to modify or place conditions on a sen-
tence from a foreign jurisdiction.  Accordingly, it appears the only way 
to effectuate a state trial court’s order that a state sentence run concur-
rently with a prior federal sentence is to have the defendant returned 
to federal custody to serve his federal sentence. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Stoliker, 315 P.2d 12, 14 (Cal. 1957) (holding that 
the petitioner was entitled to have his custody transferred when continued impri-
sonment in state prison would compel consecutive service of sentences); In re Altstatt, 
38 Cal. Rptr. 616, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964). 
 141 E.g., Clark, 468 S.E.2d at 655 n.3. 
Contrary to the Department of Correction’s contention, a transfer of 
Clark in this matter will not deprive the State of its ability to obtain cus-
tody of Clark after service of his federal sentence.  The State may place 
a detainer on Clark in order that he be returned to state prison after 
completion of his federal sentence to complete any remaining time on 
his state sentence. 
Id.  This may not be an option in every state jurisdiction as the ability to do this de-
pends on the scope and type of the authority of the state’s department of correc-
tions. 
 142 E.g., Bloomgren v. Belaski, 948 F.2d 688, 690–91 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that 
federal authorities refused to take custody of Bloomgren until he was eligible for pa-
role on his state sentence because the federal court ordered consecutive sentences 
and the state court ordered concurrent sentences).  Again, this may not be an option 
in every state jurisdiction. 
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2. Lack of Congressional Consideration of the 
Fragmentation of Authority to Impose Concurrent and 
Consecutive Sentences Between the Federal and State 
Governments 
Why is it that the federal government with secondary jurisdiction 
is able to ignore the state’s order of concurrent sentences when the 
state sentences second?  The answer is probably that both the state 
and federal legislatures did not consider the interaction of primary 
jurisdiction, judicial discretion in imposing consecutive and concur-
rent sentences, and the authority of the BOP to credit the defendant 
for time served.  The fragmentation of authority between the state 
and federal governments, as well as between the executive and judi-
cial branches, is the cause of the problem.  The result of this convo-
luted interaction is that when the federal government has secondary 
jurisdiction, the BOP can effectuate consecutive sentences despite 
the fact that the state judge sentenced last and ordered concurrent 
sentences.  This result is arbitrary and violates the notions of dual so-
vereignty, comity, and separation of powers.
143
  
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984 (the “Act”) to reduce the disparity in sentencing practices re-
garding what considerations federal judges were taking into account 
when imposing sentences.
144
  Sections 3553 and 3584 are portions of 
this Act, yet § 3584(a)’s ambiguity is a large part of the problem.
145
  
The disparity in sentencing practices was certainly not resolved with 
the Act.  In fact, these revisions have helped develop a system under 
which the federal government with secondary jurisdiction may im-
 
 143 Under the current regime, primary jurisdiction is the arbitrary determinant of 
who makes the concurrency decision.  Primary jurisdiction is not based on a concept 
of higher morality, but is analogous to the “rules of the road;” it makes the process 
easier and more predictable when different sovereigns have concurrent jurisdiction 
over a defendant.  Also, the current regime essentially allows the BOP to ignore the 
sentencing authority of the state judge. 
 144 S. REP. NO. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182. 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983 as reported by the 
Committee is the product of a decade long bipartisan effort of the Se-
nate Committee of the Judiciary, with the cooperation and support of 
successive administrations, to make major comprehensive improve-
ments to the federal criminal laws.  Significant parts of the measure, 
such as sentencing reform, bail reform, insanity defense amendments, 
drug penalty amendments, criminal forfeiture improvements, and nu-
merous relatively minor amendments, have evolved over the almost 
two-decade consideration of proposals to enact a modern Federal 
Criminal Code. 
Id. 
 145 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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pose consecutive sentences on a defendant despite the fact that a 
state judge who sentences second may order or intend to order con-
current sentences.  The reason for this scenario is that there is noth-
ing in the federal sentencing scheme that requires the judiciary or 
the BOP to consider the authority of state courts to make the concur-
rency determination.  Although this may seem to be a narrow cir-
cumstance, the case law produced by the circuit split suggests that 
this is a possible scenario.
146
  To resolve the problem, the system 
needs new sentencing practices that conform with the goals of un-
iformity and fairness.
147
 
3. Why a New Rule for the Concurrency Determination 
Between the States and Federal Governments is 
Necessary 
The temporal difference between a concurrent and a consecu-
tive sentence is substantial in many cases.  Consider the Introduc-
tion’s hypothetical: the young woman who is having a bad day shop-
lifts at fifteen different stores in Mississippi.
148
  She has two prior 
convictions for shoplifting.  She is prosecuted for fifteen counts of 
shoplifting.  The punishment for one count of felony shoplifting is 
five years in prison.
149
  If she serves the sentences for all fifteen counts 
concurrently, she will serve five years in prison.  If she serves the sen-
tences consecutively, she will serve seventy-five years in prison.  The 
difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences for this 
woman is seventy years.  For defendants, it is very important whether 
sentences are served consecutively or concurrently.  Justice Scalia 
emphasized this point in his dissent in Oregon v. Ice150 stating, 
 
 146 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 147 See Janet Alberghini, Structuring Determinate Sentencing Guidelines: Difficult Choices 
for the New Federal Sentencing Commission,  35 CATH. U. L. REV. 181, 206–07 (1985) 
(“The development and implementation of a new federal sentencing policy that is 
intended to provide greater uniformity, fairness and certainty in federal sentencing 
practices will be a formidable undertaking.”). 
 148 In Mississippi, shoplifting is a felony for a third or subsequent conviction of 
shoplifting, and carries with it a maximum of five years in prison.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 
97-23-93(6) (LEXIS, through 2010 Reg. Sess.).  Shoplifting is also a felony when $500 
or more worth of merchandise is stolen, and such conduct is punished in accordance 
with the crime of grand larceny.  § 97-23-93(7). 
 149 § 97-23-93(6). 
 150 555 U.S. 106, 174 (2009)  (Scalia, J., dissenting)  (internal citation omitted).  
Oregon v. Ice reexamined the rule from Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), that the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial 
guarantee requires that a jury determine any fact that increases the punishment for a 
particular offense.  See 555 U.S. at 163.  The Court considered an Oregon statute, OR. 
REV. STAT. § 137.123 (LEXIS, through 2009 Legis. Sess.), which provided that sen-
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There is no doubt that consecutive sentences are a “greater pu-
nishment” than concurrent sentences.  We have hitherto taken 
note of the reality that “a concurrent sentence is traditionally im-
posed as a less severe sanction than a consecutive sentence.”  The 
decision to impose consecutive sentences alters the single conse-
quence most important to convicted noncapital defendants: their 
date of release from prison.  For many defendants, the difference 
between consecutive and concurrent sentences is more important 
than a jury verdict of innocence on any single count: Two consec-
utive 10-year sentences are in most circumstances a more severe 
punishment than any number of concurrent 10-year sentences.
151
 
The defendant in Oregon v. Ice was required to serve 340 months 
(twenty-eight years and four months) in prison because the sentences 
were consecutive, but would have served only ninety months (seven 
and a half years) if the sentences were concurrent.
152
  Because of the 
great difference in duration between consecutive and concurrent 
sentences, the determination of whether sentences are served conse-
cutively or concurrently should be based on the purposes of punish-
ment. 
Currently, the system for determining consecutive or concurrent 
sentences between the state and federal governments is driven by 
primary jurisdiction.  When the state has primary jurisdiction, the 
federal government has the ability to override a state’s order of con-
current sentences.  Primary jurisdiction is essentially an arbitrary rule 
used to promote efficiency when various courts have concurrent ju-
risdiction over a defendant.  Primary jurisdiction is analogous to the 
“rules of the road”—for example that a red light indicates that cars 
should “stop” and a green light indicates that cars may proceed—in 
that it makes the operation of courts and prison systems more pre-
dictable and efficient, yet it is not based on some sense of a higher 
moral good.  For this reason, a concept like primary jurisdiction 
should not have a dispositive role in determining whether sentences 
are consecutive or concurrent and thus whether they are longer or 
shorter.  A rule that is more consistent with the purposes of punish-
 
tences run concurrently unless the judge found statutorily enumerated facts.  555 
U.S. at 165.  The statute allowed a judge to order consecutive sentences “[i]f a de-
fendant [was] simultaneously sentenced for criminal offenses that d[id] not arise 
from the same continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct.”  § 137.123(2).  
The Court determined that whether the criminal offenses arose from the same con-
tinuous course of conduct was a fact that did not have to be submitted to a jury pur-
suant to the Sixth Amendment and Apprendi/Blakely.  Ice, 555 U.S. at 170.   
 151 Ice, 555 U.S. at 174 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also 
Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 216 n.9 (1981). 
 152 555 U.S. at 166 & n.5. 
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ment needs to be implemented with regard to the concurrency de-
termination. 
III. THE PROPER SOLUTION IS THAT IF EITHER SOVEREIGN ORDERS 
CONCURRENT SENTENCES, SENTENCES MUST BE SERVED 
CONCURRENTLY 
The problem of the federal government’s ability to impose con-
secutive sentences when it has secondary jurisdiction and sentences 
first despite the concurrency order from a state judge has been con-
sidered in the past.  Previous solutions suggested by scholars are in-
adequate because they solve the problem only superficially and do 
not require federal recognition of state sentencing authority.
153
  
These solutions also assume that the policies underlying concurrent 
and consecutive sentences are of equal importance.  Because effec-
tuating consecutive sentences despite a sovereign’s decision that a de-
fendant should serve only a set term of years and nothing more vi-
olates the notion that a defendant should not receive a greater 
punishment than necessary, the system should have a preference for 
concurrent sentences.  A new rule—that if either sovereign orders 
concurrent sentences, the sentences must be served concurrently re-
gardless of sentencing order—would promote the goals of uniformi-
ty, fairness, and predictability in the criminal justice system and 
would simultaneously uphold each sovereign’s sentencing authority. 
A. Arguments in Support of the View that the Judge who Sentences 
Second Should Make the Effective Concurrency Determination Are 
Flawed 
 Several authorities suggest or support the view that the crimi-
nal justice sentencing system should place the authority to impose 
consecutive or concurrent sentences in the hands of the judge who 
sentences second.  Courts at all levels in both the federal and state 
systems have discussed the reasonableness of this principle.
154
  Many 
 
 153 See infra Part III.A. 
 154 E.g., United States v. Neely, 38 F.3d 458, 460–61 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
federal court is powerless to impose a concurrent sentence until the defendant has 
been sentenced by another court); Cozine v. Crabtree, 15 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1012 (D. 
Or. 1998); Clark v. State, 468 S.E. 2d 653, 655 (S.C. 1996); People v. Chaklader, 29 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 346–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citing § 669 of the California Penal 
Code and reasoning that “[e]ven under California law, the choice between concur-
rent and consecutive sentences lies in the court which pronounces judgment 
second”); Thompson v. State, 565 S.W.2d 889, 890 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (hold-
ing that a consecutive sentence may only be imposed in relation to an already im-
posed sentence). 
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of these courts explain that allowing otherwise would permit the 
court that sentences first to preempt the second court’s sentencing 
discretion.
155
  Other courts explain that the judge who sentences first 
cannot be sure of the length of future sentences when the length of 
sentences is relevant to the decision to impose concurrent or consec-
utive sentences.
156
  Lastly, some courts additionally assert that the 
principles of dual sovereignty
157
 and comity
158
 require this result. 
 
 155 E.g., United States v. Eastman, 758 F.2d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1984); State v. Ar-
nold, 824 S.W.2d 176, 178  (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (“Otherwise, the first sentenc-
ing court’s action would be preemptive of the last court’s function and power to im-
pose a sentence which is based upon all that has gone before.”). 
Allowing the second sentencing court to determine whether a sentence 
is to run concurrently with, or consecutively to, the prior sentence(s), is 
consistent with this goal of avoiding conflicts between coordinate 
courts and sovereigns.  This rule permits courts, corrections officials, 
and defendants to easily compute the sentences owed by defendants 
and the effect of any new sentence that may be imposed.  The alterna-
tive would allow one sovereign to interfere with the rights of other so-
vereigns by prospectively running a sentence consecutive to—or con-
current with—sentences that might someday be imposed by another 
sovereign, without even knowing the circumstances of those future sen-
tences.  The other sovereigns, in turn, might follow their own laws and 
order that their sentences run concurrently with, or consecutively to, 
any pre-existing sentences.  The two sentences would then be in con-
flict, which creates uncertainty and ambiguity and may result in prob-
lems in calculation of service of the sentence. 
Cozine, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 156 E.g., Salley v. United States, 786 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 1986) (Newman, J.,  
concurring) (explaining that the first judge relinquishes sentencing authority to the 
second judge who effectively extends the expiration date of the first judge’s sentence 
and that the length of a consecutive sentence is not well reasoned when the court 
does not know how long the other sentence will be) (“The length of the primary sen-
tence is always relevant to a reasoned decision concerning both the length of a con-
secutive sentence and the choice of imposing it consecutively.”); Luther v. Vanyur, 14 
F. Supp. 2d 773, 776 (E.D.N.C. 1997) (“[W]hether two sentences imposed at differ-
ent times by different judges should run consecutively or concurrently must necessar-
ily be decided by the second sentencing judge because at the first sentencing the is-
sue doesn’t arise.”). 
 157 E.g., Hawley v. United States, 898 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Because 
of the division of powers between the federal government and the states under the 
dual sovereignty principle of our form of government, a defendant may not, by 
agreement with state authorities, compel the federal government to impose a sen-
tence that is concurrent with an existing state sentence.”); Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 
27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[E]ven if the state sentence has been imposed with the expec-
tation that it will be served concurrently with a yet-to-be imposed federal sentence, 
the federal court need not make its sentence concurrent with the state sentence but 
remains free to make the federal sentence consecutive.”); United States v. Sackinger, 
704 F.2d 29, 32  (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that, under dual sovereignty, a state cannot 
bind a federal court that sentences second to concurrent sentences through a plea 
agreement with the defendant); Meagher v. Dugger, 737 F. Supp. 641, 646 (S.D. Fla. 
1990); Chaklader, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347 (holding that under dual sovereignty, the 
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Another argument in favor of the view that the judge who sen-
tences second alone should have the concurrency determination is 
that this is the best way to fulfill the requirements of various sentenc-
ing statutes.  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists several factors 
that federal courts should consider when imposing a sentence: the 
need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,” the need to deter fu-
ture criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public from the 
defendant.
159
  The court that sentences second can take these factors 
into consideration, in light of the other sovereign’s sentence for the 
defendant, to properly impose a consecutive or concurrent sen-
tence.
160
  Consecutive and concurrent sentences by their very nature 
affect the length of time the defendant is incarcerated.  Therefore, 
the argument is that the court that sentences second is able to con-
sider the need for deterrence, the history of the defendant, and the 
need to protect the public by making the defendant’s sentence long-
er or shorter through a consecutive or concurrent sentence. 
The Sentencing Guidelines explain that the goal of federal 
courts ordering consecutive or concurrent sentences is to “achiev[e] 
a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.”
161
  The Commen-
tary further explains that a federal court should consider the length 
and type of an undischarged sentence, among other factors.
162
  This 
 
state court could not bind the federal court’s ability to impose a concurrent or con-
secutive sentence with the existing state sentence). 
 158 E.g., United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 243, 244 (8th Cir. 1992) (“[W]hen feder-
al and state sentences conflict, the district court’s sentence does not have to give way 
to the earlier state court sentence.”); Cozine, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (“It would be 
extraordinarily provincial for the United States to assert that federal courts may im-
pose sentences that run concurrently with preexisting state sentences but not the 
other way around.”). 
 159 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).  For the text of § 3553(a), see supra note 74. 
 160 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.3(c) cmt. background (2008). 
Background: In a case in which a defendant is subject to an undi-
scharged sentence of imprisonment, the court generally has authority 
to impose an imprisonment sentence on the current offense to run 
concurrently with or consecutively to the prior undischarged term. 18 
U.S.C. § 3584(a).  Exercise of that authority, however, is predicated on 
the court’s consideration of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 
including any applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission. 
Id. 
 161 Id. § 5G1.3(c) (“(Policy Statement) In any other case involving an undi-
scharged term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed 
to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undi-
scharged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant 
offense.”). 
 162 Id. § 5G1.3 cmt. n.3. 
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authority lends further support to the notion that the second judge 
should have the final word about consecutive or concurrent sen-
tences because the second judge is best able to evaluate what is a fair 
and just sentence in light of the sentence imposed by the first court. 
Scholars have likewise concluded that a sovereign that sentences 
first, regardless of whether it is the state or federal government, 
should not bind the sovereign who sentences second with respect to 
concurrent or consecutive sentences.
163
  These scholars argue that the 
second judge should be able to order a sentence to be served concur-
rently or consecutively with an undischarged sentence, and that the 
first judge should not make this determination prospectively.
164
 
 Despite the considerations behind the view that the second 
sentencing judge should always have the concurrency determination, 
this result is neither efficient nor effective enough to truly resolve the 
problem.  First, the system is too fragmented to enforce the rule that 
the judge who sentences second would always have the concurrency 
determination.  This is evidenced by some flawed suggestions by scho-
lars.
165
  Savvas Diacosavvas recommends reworking Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 35(a)
166
 to provide a more reasonable window for 
amending sentences, thus allowing a federal court to revise its sen-
 
Application of Subsection (c). (A) In General. Under subsection (c), the 
court may impose a sentence concurrently, partially concurrently, or 
consecutively to the undischarged term of imprisonment.  In order to 
achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense 
and avoid unwarranted disparity, the court should consider the follow-
ing: (i) the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (referencing 18 U.S.C § 
3553(a)); (ii) the type (e.g., determinate, indeterminate/parolable) 
and length of the prior undischarged sentence; (iii) the time served on 
the undischarged sentence and the time likely to be served before re-
lease; (iv) the fact that the prior undischarged sentence may have been 
imposed in state court rather than federal court, or at a different time 
before the same or different federal court; and (v) any other circums-
tance relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence for the 
instant offense. 
Id. 
 163 See generally Erin E. Goffette, Sovereignty in Sentencing: Concurrent and Consecutive 
Sentencing of a Defendant Subject to Simultaneous State and Federal Jurisdiction, 37 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 1035 (2003).  
 164 See id. 
 165 See, e.g., id.; James J. Sample, The Sentences That Bind (The States), 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 969 (2003). 
 166 FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a).  This section currently reads, “Correcting Clear Error. 
Within 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from 
arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”  Id.  Diacosavvas actually states that FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 35(c) should be amended, but then cites the language of FED. R. CRIM. P. 
35(a) in note 94.  See Diacosavvas, supra note 110, at 227, 245 n.94.  Presumably the 
intention was to amend FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). 
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tence after a state court, initially sentencing second, imposed a con-
secutive or concurrent sentence.
167
  Diacosavvas’s solution may practi-
cally solve the problem, but only in the sense that it allows the federal 
judge to always give the second sentence.  There is no compelling 
federal interest to support the position that the federal government 
should always have the final decision with respect to consecutive or 
concurrent sentences. 
 Some federal courts have complained that if a federal court 
could not compel the state to give consecutive sentences, the federal 
sentence would be subsumed by the state sentence and thereby ne-
gated.
168
  The states could have these same concerns.  The state sen-
tence subsuming the federal sentence is not a valid concern.  Why 
does the federal government have any interest in the state sentence 
of a defendant?  If the defendant serves the prescribed amount of 
time for the federal crime, the concern of the federal government 
should end there.
169
  The imposition of a concurrent sentence by a 
state court in no way reduces the federal sentence.
170
  Additionally, 
the federal government cannot force states to impose sentences on 
criminals for state crimes.
171
  Nor can the federal government even 
 
 167 Diacosavvas, supra note 110, at 227–28.  The Second Circuit in United States v. 
Donoso, 521 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2008), upheld the federal district court’s use of FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 35(a) to amend its sentence after the state court had sentenced the defen-
dant. Id. at 146 
 168 E.g., United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1509 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
if the twenty-one-month federal sentence was served concurrently with the antic-
ipated ten-year state sentence, the federal sentence would be negated and would 
preclude Ballard from serving separate time for his federal sentence).  It is important 
to note that in Ballard, the defendant wrote a letter, while in state custody, threaten-
ing the President’s life, which is a federal offense, so that he could be incarcerated in 
a federal institution.  Id. at 1503.  Ballard is arguably a fact-specific case, and the Ele-
venth Circuit was especially concerned with allowing a defendant to manipulate the 
criminal justice system by committing a second crime in order to serve his sentence 
in a preferable institution.  Id. at 1510. 
 169 Goffette, supra note 163, at 1084. 
     Federal courts have expressed the sentiment that the federal sen-
tence “disappears” or is “negated” when a state sentence is served con-
currently with the federal sentence.  This is a fallacy.  A federal court 
has no authority over a sentence given in a state court nor over the 
manner in which a state court effectuates state law.  At the time a fed-
eral court sentences a defendant, it intends for the defendant to serve a 
specified number of months in prison.  A concurrent state sentence in 
no way reduces the length of the original sentence imposed by the fed-
eral court. 
Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See Sample, supra note 165, at 990 (“Consider that the federal government may 
not prevent states from sentencing state criminals to terms of no imprisonment what-
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require the state government to criminalize certain behavior.
172
  For 
example, medical marijuana is legal in California
173
 despite the fact 
that the federal government declares the use of medical marijuana 
illegal.
174
  If states are allowed to legalize (for state-law purposes) con-
duct that is illegal under federal law, the federal government certain-
ly does not have an interest in usurping a more insignificant aspect of 
state sovereignty, for example by always making the final decision of 
whether sentences are concurrent or consecutive.  Additionally, if the 
state chooses not to prosecute a defendant, the federal government 
cannot compel the state to do so.
175
  Therefore, the federal interest in 
criminal justice ends after the defendant serves the sentence imposed 
on him by the federal government. 
 Furthermore, allowing the federal judge to make the final de-
termination would not enhance accountability.  Federal judges are 
appointed for life,
176
 whereas many state judges are elected.
177
  In fact, 
allowing a state judge to make the final determination regarding 
concurrency would enhance accountability because federal judges 
are not elected, and are therefore not accountable to the people for 
their decisions.   
Another problem with the solution advanced by Diacosavvas is 
that the states could likewise use their analogous sentence amend-
ment statutes or revise these statutes to give state courts a greater 
window of time to amend their sentences.  This could have the effect 
of creating a battle between state and federal judges of post hoc sen-
tencing revisions as each court tries to impose its sentence last.  Ex-
 
soever.  Where then is the justification for preventing states from crediting convicts 
for time served while they are confined in non-state facilities?”). 
 172 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (holding that Congress 
can encourage but not compel state legislatures to enact particular laws).   
 173 Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deer-
ing, LEXIS through 2011 Extraordinary Sess.). 
 174 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (2006); §§ 841(a)(1), 
844(a); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28–29 (2005) (holding that Congress 
has the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the use of medical marijuana 
even though California’s Code expressly allows the use of medical marijuana). 
 175 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 933, 935 (1997) (holding that 
Congress cannot compel state officers to enforce federal law). 
 176 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 177 Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
2008, at A1.  Approximately 87% of state judges face some kind of election, and thir-
ty-nine states elect some of their judges.  Id.; see also G. Alan Tarr, Selection of State Ap-
pellate Judges: Reform Proposals: Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, 39 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1449 (2003) (explaining that scholars categorize states by 
the states’ systems of judicial selection, including partisan election, nonpartisan elec-
tion, legislative election, gubernatorial appointment, or merit selection). 
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tending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure’s timeframe for sen-
tence amendments is an arbitrary solution and does not lead to a le-
gally sound resolution of the federal government’s failure to recog-
nize the sentencing authority of the states. 
Another scholar, Erin G. Goffette, proposes a model state statute 
which would apply when a state court has primary jurisdiction and 
sentences second.
178
  If the court decides to impose a concurrent sen-
tence but knows that it will be unable to effectuate that sentence—
because the defendant would serve the federal sentence second and 
the BOP would most likely refuse to credit the defendant with time 
served in the state institution—the model statute would allow the 
court to ignore state statutory minimums and give credit to the de-
fendant based on the length of the federal sentence.
179
  In effect, the 
 
 178 See Goffette, supra note 163, at 1097–99. 
 179 Id. Goffette’s suggested model statute reads: 
Concurrent sentences; crediting a term of imprisonment to account for an undi-
scharged federal sentence 
(a) Eligible Defendants.  This section is applicable to defendants who are in the 
primary custody of the state and are subject to an undischarged federal term of 
imprisonment, and for whom the court wishes to impose a sentence to run con-
currently with the undischarged term of imprisonment. 
(b) Statement of Purpose.  The purpose of this section is to authorize the court to 
effectuate a concurrent sentence in those instances in which the court has discre-
tion under [insert state statute(s)] to impose a sentence to be served concurrently 
with an undischarged federal term of imprisonment. In order to ensure that the 
court’s sentence will be served concurrently with the existing federal sentence, the 
court may achieve the equivalent of concurrent sentences by crediting the state 
sentence by the number of months intended to run concurrently with the federal 
sentence. 
(c) Realization of Concurrent Sentences.  When sentencing an eligible defen-
dant, the court, in order to effectuate concurrent sentences, shall establish the 
term of imprisonment for the instant offense, including any credit as calculated 
under state statute, shall identify the proceedings in which the federal sentence 
was imposed, and  
(1) if the term of imprisonment for the instant offense is longer than the undi-
scharged federal term of imprisonment, shall credit the term of imprisonment for 
the instant offense by the minimum number of months of the undischarged fed-
eral term of imprisonment that remain at the time of sentencing for the instant 
offense; or 
(2) if the term of imprisonment for the instant offense is shorter than the mini-
mum number of months of the undischarged federal term of imprisonment that 
remain at the time of sentencing for the instant offense, shall designate the de-
fendant’s sentence as satisfied by the federal sentence and shall order the defen-
dant released to federal custody. 
(d) Substitution of Credited Sentence for Mandatory Minimum.  If the sentence 
for the instant offense mandates a minimum term of imprisonment, the court 
may substitute a credited sentence for the statutory minimum according to provi-
sions (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this section. 
Id.  
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state would give a shorter sentence than it normally would because 
after the defendant serves this shorter sentence, he will serve time in 
a federal institution.  Thus, the defendant would serve the amount of 
time deemed necessary by the state even though the state has primary 
jurisdiction. 
There are several problems with Goffette’s model statute.  One 
problem is that the proposal is merely a model state statute, which 
means that the statute would resolve the fragmentation of authority 
in sentencing practices only in the particular states that choose to 
enact this statute.  It is difficult to imagine that every single state 
would enact the model statute.
180
  Even if all but one state adopt the 
model statute, one hold-out would prevent reaching the goal of a 
completely uniform system.  Furthermore, if the federal sentence is 
reversed on appeal, then the state may have imposed a much shorter 
sentence than the state deemed appropriate in accordance with the 
model statute in order to compensate for the initial imposition of a 
consecutive sentence by the federal government.  Another problem 
with Goffette’s approach is that, although the statute solves the frag-
mentation dilemma in practice,
181
 it does not resolve the failure of ei-
ther sovereign to recognize the sentence of the other.  The principles 
of dual sovereignty and comity are not served when the state and fed-
eral governments can use a statutory loophole to circumvent recogni-
tion of the other sovereign’s authority.
182
  For these reasons, Gof-
fette’s model statute is not a sufficient solution to the fragmentation 
of authority in the sentencing practices. 
Another problem with allowing the second judge to always make 
the final sentencing determination is that it presumes concurrent 
and consecutive sentences should be given the same priority and 
 
 180 For example, Congress enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act in 
1970, which had been enacted by only forty-six states by 1978.  United States v. Mau-
ro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978).  Although this is a vast majority of the states, any hold-
outs prevent uniformity of application of an agreement and may lead to some uncer-
tainty. 
 181 It is important to note that Goffette also eliminates the ability of the BOP to 
ignore the sentence of the judge who sentences second when making credit deter-
minations, and therefore the separation of power problem is not part of the critique 
of her proposed model statute.  Goffette, supra note 163, at 1094–96.  However, Gof-
fette does not propose a solution that would prevent state correctional departments 
from ignoring the sentence of the judge who sentences second. 
 182 Goffette recognizes the importance of the principles as well.  Id. at 1100 
(“Equitably, the doctrines of comity and dual sovereignty mandate that a second sen-
tencing court be as free in its authority to sentence under the laws of the jurisdiction 
as a first sentencing court.”).  Therefore, her solution needs to go further to ensure 
that these principles are actually satisfied and not simply assume that they appear to 
be satisfied in practice. 
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therefore that the order of sentencing should be determinative.  The 
next section will discuss the policy reasons for giving priority to con-
current sentences and why concurrent sentences should be given pre-
ference over consecutive sentences in determining the totality of the 
defendant’s sentences. 
B. The General Rule Should Be that if Either Sovereign Orders 
Concurrent Sentences, Sentences Must Be Served Concurrently 
Regardless of Sentencing Order 
 The solution to the problems discussed in the previous section 
is the enactment of a general rule that mandates that sentences run 
concurrently if either the state or the federal government so orders.  
This would promote efficiency, uniformity, predictability, and fair-
ness in the criminal justice system. 
 Several reasons exist for imposing consecutive rather than 
concurrent sentences or vice versa.  Congress has promulgated a va-
riety of factors that federal judges should consider when fashioning 
an appropriate sentence for an offender under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
183
  
All of these factors must be viewed in light of the limiting principle at 
the beginning of the statute, which states that the sentence imposed 
should be sufficient but “not greater than necessary. . . .”
184
  Among 
these factors are the nature of the offense, the history of the defen-
dant, the need to promote compliance with the law, the need to “re-
flect the seriousness of the offense,” the need to provide just punish-
ment, the need to promote deterrence, and the need to protect the 
public.
185
  Consecutive sentences are used to lengthen the term of 
imprisonment, and are recommended by the Sentencing Commis-
sion for revocation of probation or violation of supervised release.
186
  
Factors that may weigh in favor of consecutive sentences may be the 
number of the defendant’s previous offenses, “the nature of the 
crimes involved,” or the great danger that the defendant may pose to 
society.
187
  Concurrent sentences may be appropriate where the de-
fendant faces multiple charges for the same activity.
188
  Concurrent 
 
 183 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); see supra note 74. 
 184 Id. § 3553(a). 
 185 Id. 
 186 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) (2008).   
 187 Steve Thompson, Concurrent Vs. Consecutive Sentences in Criminal Law, 
ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Oct. 19, 2006), 
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/71874/concurrent_vs_consecutive_sente
nces.html?cat=17. 
 188 Mike Jacobs, Comment to Concurrent Sentencing, MISC.LEGAL.MODERATED, 
GOOGLE GROUPS (Nov. 29, 2008, 7:08 PM), 
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sentences may also be appropriate where the same act violates more 
than one criminal statute.
189
  Other mitigating factors, such as the de-
fendant’s possible loss of familial support, his job, or future respect, 
may favor concurrent sentences.
190
  Concurrent sentences are also 
used when there are multiple charges against the defendant and the 
judge is concerned that one or more of the sentences could be over-
turned on appeal.
191
  In this situation, the judge may determine that 
justice is fulfilled by the defendant’s service of a sentence for any one 
of the offenses.
192
 
 In any given circumstance, the judge weighs these various fac-
tors and determines whether to impose a concurrent or consecutive 
sentence in light of any other charges the defendant faces or any 
other offenses for which the defendant has been convicted.  It is in 
the judge’s discretion to choose consecutive or concurrent sen-
tences.
193
  When multiple judges considering the same information 
decide differently on the concurrency issue, which sentence should 
prevail?  To answer this question, one must realize that concurrent 
and consecutive sentences should not be given equal priority.
194
  Be-
cause consecutive sentences by their nature are longer, are a greater 
punishment, and are a greater restriction on freedom,
195
  concurrent 
sentences should be given preference in order to promote justice and 
fairness in the criminal justice system. 
 Additionally, when one sovereign determines, considering all 
pending charges and offenses, that a concurrent sentence is appro-
priate for those charges and offenses, the system should not provide 
that sovereign a greater punishment than the sovereign ordered.  
Forcing a greater sentence upon the sovereign violates the sentenc-
 
http://groups.google.com/group/misc.legal.moderated/browse_thread/thread/41
bd1be20e770ab7.   
 189 CHRISTOPHER HARDING & RICHARD W. IRELAND, PUNISHMENT: RHETORIC, RULE, 
AND PRACTICE 29 (1989). 
 190 See id. at 46. 
 191 Jacobs, supra note 188.   
 192 Id. 
 193 See supra Part II.A. 
 194 See John F. Carr, Comment to Concurrent Sentencing, MISC.LEGAL.MODERATED, 
GOOGLE GROUPS (Nov. 29, 2008, 6:06 PM) 
http://groups.google.com/group/misc.legal.moderated/browse_thread/thread/41
bd1be20e770ab7.   
 195 Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 174 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no 
doubt that consecutive sentences are a ‘greater punishment’ than concurrent sen-
tences.  We have hitherto taken note of the reality that ‘a concurrent sentence is tra-
ditionally imposed as a less severe sanction than a consecutive sentence.” (internal 
citations omitted)); see also Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 216 n.9 (1981). 
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ing autonomy of the sovereign.  Therefore, the general rule should 
be that if either judge, state or federal, orders concurrent sentences, 
the sentences should be served concurrently regardless of the sen-
tencing order.  This rule would eliminate the determinative nature of 
primary jurisdiction on the actual length of imprisonment of the de-
fendant who is subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal 
and state governments.  Under the current scheme, when the state 
government has primary jurisdiction, the federal government can ef-
fectuate consecutive sentences even though the state has ordered 
concurrent sentences.  Primary jurisdiction is an arbitrary concept 
which promotes efficiency and predictability when marshals and pris-
on officials transfer a defendant between jurisdictions.  It is similar to 
the “rules of the road”—for example, that vehicles drive on the right 
side of the road—which are based on uniformity and not on notions 
of morality and justice.  Imposing a rule that sentences must be 
served concurrently if either sovereign orders concurrent sentences 
would reduce the arbitrary effects of the fragmentation of sentencing 
authority between the state and federal governments and additionally 
would promote the fundamental principles that underlie the criminal 
justice system. 
 Further, several authorities suggest that a sentence should not 
impose any greater punishment than necessary and perhaps even that 
concurrent sentences are preferable.  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) lists factors that judges must consider when imposing sen-
tences but qualifies these factors by requiring that a sentence be suf-
ficient “but not greater than necessary . . . .”
196
  With this language in 
mind, if Sovereign A orders five years for the defendant under the as-
sumption that “five years are enough” and Sovereign B is satisfied by 
a two-year concurrent sentence for the crime the defendant commit-
ted under Sovereign B’s laws, causing the defendant to serve seven 
years through consecutive sentences exceeds the needs of either so-
vereign and is “greater than necessary” under section 3553(a).  Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits not only 
barbaric modes of punishment but also sentences that are dispropor-
tionate to the nature of the crime committed.
197
  Thus, if one sove-
 
 196 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).  For the text of the statute, see supra note 74. 
 197 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284–89 (1983). 
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go 
beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language 
of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to 
provide at least the same protection—including the right to be free 
from excessive punishments. 
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reign ordered concurrent sentences but the sentences are served 
consecutively, the sentences served by the prisoner may arguably be 
disproportionate to the crime committed under the laws of the sove-
reign that ordered concurrent sentences.  Therefore, if one sovereign 
orders concurrent sentences, the sentences should be served concur-
rently.  In fact, some states have presumptions in favor of concurrent 
sentences and may interpret ambiguous sentences to be concur-
rent.
198
  These authorities lend support to the notion that concurrent 
and consecutive sentences are not of equal priority and perhaps that 
concurrent sentences should be favored in the criminal justice sys-
tem. 
 Another rationale behind this theory is that it is illogical to 
force a sovereign to have a defendant serve a greater sentence than 
that sovereign intended or required. Concurrent sentences do not 
indicate that one sovereign does not receive a sentence served by the 
defendant for a crime in violation of that sovereign’s laws.  Rather, 
each sovereign has an interest in causing a defendant to serve only a 
sentence for the crime that the defendant committed in violation of 
the sovereign’s own laws.  Neither sovereign has any interest in the 
sentence served by the defendant for the other sovereign.  This is not 
 
Id. at 286 (emphasis added).  It is important to note that Justice Scalia, in his concur-
ring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, challenged the Court’s holding in Solem, and 
argued that the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment to the 
extent of forbidding barbaric modes of punishment but does not forbid dispropor-
tionate punishments.  501 U.S. 957, 974–79 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
     In sum, we think it most unlikely that the English Cruell and Un-
usuall Punishments Clause was meant to forbid “disproportionate” pu-
nishments.  There is even less likelihood that proportionality of pu-
nishment was one of the traditional “rights and privileges of 
Englishmen” apart from the Declaration of Rights, which happened to 
be included in the Eighth Amendment. 
Id. at 974 (emphasis added).   Justice Scalia wrote the lead opinion, but the portion 
of the opinion that challenges Solem was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.  De-
spite Justice Scalia’s challenge, Solem arguably stands for the principle that the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment encompasses a ban on 
punishments that are disproportionate to the crime committed.  In a concurring 
opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, Jus-
tice Kennedy stated, “Our decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.”  Id. at 997 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring).   
 198 CAL. PENAL CODE § 669 (Deering, LEXIS through 2011 Extraordinary Sess.) 
(“Upon the failure of the court to determine how the terms of imprisonment on the 
second or subsequent judgment shall run, the term of imprisonment on the second 
or subsequent judgment shall run concurrently.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.123 (LEXIS 
through 2009 Leg. Sess.); see also In re Altstatt, 38 Cal. Rptr. 616, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1964) (In reference to section 669, the court stated that “[i]n statutory construction, 
the interpretation resulting in concurrent sentences is favored.”). 
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to say that a multiple offender should not receive a higher penalty 
than a single offender simply because his multiple offenses are in vi-
olation of the laws of different sovereigns.  What this means is that 
each sovereign, at the time of sentencing, can take into account the 
various sentences that the defendant has served in the past and the 
offenses that the defendant has committed prior to the sentencing.  
If after taking this into account the sovereign determines that the de-
fendant should serve only one particular block of time for his crime 
under the sovereign’s laws, then the sovereign should not be forced 
to have the defendant serve a longer period for the same offense.  A 
judge may determine that, in light of all the factors related to the 
crimes of the defendant, a two-year sentence is sufficient.  By impos-
ing a concurrent sentence, the judge is essentially declaring that the 
court does not deem any additional years necessary if the other sove-
reign concludes that more than two years are appropriate.  Each so-
vereign has an interest only in a defendant serving the prescribed 
sentence for the offense under the laws of that sovereign.  If Sove-
reign A orders consecutive sentences at the protest of Sovereign B, 
Sovereign A should not be able to force Sovereign B to have the de-
fendant serve more time than Sovereign B deems appropriate.  Sove-
reign A has the option of making its sentence longer, up to the limi-
tations of statutory maximums, but Sovereign A’s recourse should not 
be imposing a consecutive sentence over the objection of Sovereign 
B. 
 During the nation’s founding and the drafting of the Constitu-
tion, the people delegated some state power to the federal govern-
ment, but the states retained all power not given to the federal gov-
ernment.
199
  A major area of law governed by the states is criminal 
law.
200
  In addition, there are many criminal acts that offend both 
state and federal law, such as drug possession.  Because of federal-
ism—the division of powers between the state and federal govern-
ments—neither the federal nor the state government has any interest 
in the sentence imposed on the defendant by the other sovereign.
201
  
Therefore, if either sovereign orders that the defendant serve the 
sentence concurrently with any other sentences the defendant is serv-
 
 199 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”). 
 200 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918–19 (1997) (discussing residual 
state sovereignty). 
 201 Consider the fact that California has decriminalized medical marijuana while 
the federal government continues to criminalize this offense.  See supra notes 173–74 
and accompanying text. 
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ing or will serve,
202
 then the sovereign should get no more than or-
dered, and the defendant should serve his sentence for that sovereign 
concurrently regardless of the sentencing order of the sovereigns.
203
   
Another reason for implementing the proposed general rule—
that the defendant must serve concurrent sentences if either sove-
reign orders a concurrent sentence regardless of the order of sen-
tencing and order of service—is that this will provide a more predict-
able and fair system which allows sovereigns and defendants to enter 
into plea agreements and to have greater confidence in their efficacy.  
The current system allows a federal judge who sentences first but who 
has secondary jurisdiction to order a sentence to be served consecu-
tively with a pending but yet-to-be imposed state sentence that will be 
served first.
204
  Under this regime, a plea agreement with the state for 
concurrent sentences may be rendered ineffective because, since the 
federal sentence is served second, the defendant may actually be re-
quired to serve consecutive sentences if the BOP refuses to give credit 
for time served in a state correctional facility.
205
  This is problematic 
because plea agreements are valued in the criminal justice system as a 
 
 202 This limitation is important.  The rule proposed by this Comment does not 
suggest that all crimes committed by the defendant after sentencing or during the 
service of his sentence should also be served concurrently.  This is illogical and would 
violate principles of retribution and just punishment.  Only the offenses by the de-
fendant that are known to the sovereign or sentences that the defendant is currently 
serving should run concurrently with a concurrent sentence imposed by the sove-
reign. 
 203 This rule applies to concurrent jurisdiction between more than one state or 
concurrent jurisdiction between the state and the federal governments.  This Com-
ment focuses on the concurrent jurisdiction between the state and federal govern-
ments, but the policy concerns underlying the rule endorsed by this Comment—that 
if either sovereign orders concurrent sentences, the sentences must be served con-
currently—are promoted when this rule is applied to conflicts between states. 
 204 This, of course, depends upon the outcome of the circuit split in the circuit 
where the case is pending.  See supra Part II.A.2.  As discussed above, even when the 
federal judge is silent because the circuit has determined that the federal judge may 
not declare sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively where the federal 
judge sentences before the state, the BOP still has the power to cause the sentences 
to be served consecutively.  See supra Part II.B. 
 205 See, e.g., Hawley v. United States, 898 F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990); Pinaud 
v. James, 851 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Sackinger, 704 F.2d 29, 32 
(2d Cir. 1983) (holding that under dual sovereignty, a state cannot bind a federal 
court sentencing second to concurrent sentences through a plea agreement with the 
defendant); Meagher v. Dugger, 737 F. Supp. 641, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“[A] defen-
dant may not, by agreement with state authorities, compel the federal government to 
impose a sentence that is concurrent . . . .” (quoting Hawley v. United States, 898 
F.2d 1513, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990))); People v. Chaklader, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 347 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that under dual sovereignty, the state court could not 
bind the federal court’s ability to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence with 
the existing state sentence). 
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means of efficient and speedy resolution of criminal matters and as a 
way to quickly relieve dockets.
206
  Even if the state could vacate its 
prior plea agreement based on the federal government’s imposition 
of consecutive sentences and potentially give the defendant no sen-
tence or a sentence of time served, it is impractical to compel the 
state to take this step, especially considering the efficiency goals of 
plea agreements.  Additionally, under the current system, if a federal 
judge sentences last, a prior plea agreement with the state authorities 
for concurrent service could become ineffective because a state court 
cannot prospectively bind a federal court to concurrent sentences.
207
  
These results are arbitrary and violate not only the rights of the de-
fendant but also the rights of the state sovereign that entered into the 
plea agreement with the defendant.
208
  If the rule is that sentences 
 
 206 Plea agreements reduce transaction costs in the courts of both the federal and 
state governments, and clear up dockets.  In many circumstances, plea agreements 
are a preferable way to come to a resolution in criminal matters. E.g., Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260–61 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 
(1970); United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1988). 
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prose-
cutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called “plea bargaining,” is 
an essential component of the administration of justice.  Properly ad-
ministered, it is to be encouraged.  If every criminal charge were sub-
jected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would 
need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facili-
ties. 
     Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential 
part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.  It 
leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it 
avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-
trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it 
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to con-
tinue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shorten-
ing the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may 
be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately 
imprisoned. 
Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260–61. 
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages 
of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious—his 
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, 
and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated.  For the State there 
are also advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment after an 
admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punish-
ment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial 
resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial 
issue of the defendant’s guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that 
the State can sustain its burden of proof.  
Brady, 397 U.S. at 752. 
 207 See supra note 205. 
 208 See Goffette, supra note 163, at 1088. 
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must be served concurrently if either sovereign orders concurrent 
sentences regardless of sentencing order, prosecutors and defendants 
could more confidently enter into plea agreements and know that 
the plea agreements would be enforceable with regard to consecutive 
or concurrent sentences.  Both the sovereign and the defendant 
would be assured that the concurrency determination in the plea 
agreement will in fact be the type of sentence served by the defen-
dant.  Both would know that primary jurisdiction and the arbitrary 
order of sentencing would not alter the effectiveness of the plea 
agreement. 
 In addition to these considerations, some of the most funda-
mental principles of the American criminal justice system are that (1) 
people are innocent until proven guilty
209
 and that (2) it is better to 
have a guilty man go free than to incarcerate an innocent man.
210
  
These often-referenced fundamentals suggest a policy of erring on 
the side of caution in the American legal system, which means that 
the system favors lesser restrictions on freedom when mistakes are 
possible.  When sovereigns disagree as to whether sentences should 
be concurrent or consecutive, the system should continue to err on 
the side of caution and impose concurrent sentences to avoid impos-
ing sentences that are a greater-than-necessary punishment. 
 Further, the art of sentencing cannot truly be objectified.  Al-
though the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, federal statutory max-
imums and minimums, and similar state statutory devices provide a 
great deal of guidance to judges, it can rarely if ever be said that the 
defendant got precisely the sentence that he deserved.  The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are discretionary, not mandatory,
211
 and 
judges have leeway in departing from statutory minimums imposed 
 
 209 E.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452–54 (1895) (holding that a de-
fendant has a right to have the court instruct the jury on the presumption of inno-
cence and tracing the presumption of innocence past England, past ancient Greece 
and Rome, at least to Deuteronomy); Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest van den Haag, On the 
Common Saying that It Is Better that Ten Guilty Persons Escape than that One Innocent Suffer: 
Pro and Con, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 226, 226 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. 
eds., 1990); Jean Francois Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Zadig, or Destiny, in CANDIDE AND 
OTHER STORIES 131 (Roger Pearson, trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1992). 
 210 See, e.g., William J. Brennan Jr., The Contemporary Constitution, KETTERING 
REVIEW, Fall 1987, at 10; Reiman & van den Haag, supra note 209; Voltaire, supra note 
209.  Scholars differ on exactly how many guilty men should go free under this say-
ing.  For a discussion on the various number proposed by different scholars, see Al-
exander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174–77 (1997).  See, e.g., Rei-
man & van den Haag, supra (ten guilty men). 
 211 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that making the 
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment). 
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by Congress.
212
  With this lack of objective criteria upon which to de-
termine a sentence, let alone whether the sentence should be con-
current or consecutive, the criminal justice system should err on the 
side of caution and follow the determination of the judge that will re-
strict the defendant’s freedom for a lesser period of time.  Requiring 
that the defendant serve concurrent sentences regardless of the order 
of sentencing if either a federal or a state judge orders concurrent 
sentences would align the sentencing practices between the state and 
federal government with the fundamental principles that underlie 
the American criminal justice system.  Because the “right” sentence 
that the defendant should serve cannot be objectively determined, 
the system should give the defendant a concurrent sentence if either 
sovereign so orders.  This would avoid punishing the defendant with 
a greater sentence than is necessary. 
For these reasons, the interaction between the state and federal 
criminal justice systems should in law and in fact require that if either 
judge orders the sentences to be served concurrently, the sentences 
must be served concurrently.  The issue then would be how to 
achieve this result. 
IV. CREATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE RULE THAT IF EITHER 
SOVEREIGN ORDERS CONCURRENT SENTENCES, THE DEFENDANT MUST 
SERVE THE SENTENCES CONCURRENTLY 
 The fragmentation of sentencing authority between the federal 
and state governments with regard to concurrency results in the fed-
eral government, when it exercises secondary jurisdiction, being able 
to effectuate consecutive sentences even if the state orders concur-
rent sentences.
213
  The proper solution to this problem would be to 
demand that the sentences run concurrently if either sovereign im-
poses concurrent sentences.  This requires the revision of two federal 
statutes and the use of two federal statutes that are currently in place.  
This problem affects not only the states but also the federal govern-
ment, and therefore, the solution needs to be effective for all sove-
reigns. 
 
 212 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2008); see also United States 
v. Lowe, 136 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 213 See supra Part II.D.2. 
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A. Creation of the Rule that if Either Sovereign Orders Concurrent 
Sentences, the Sentences Must Be Served Concurrently 
First, the law must resolve the problem of the federal govern-
ment’s ability, in some circuits, to impose consecutive sentences on 
the defendant when it has secondary jurisdiction but sentences first.  
Congress should revise § 3584(a)
214
 to clarify any disagreement be-
tween the circuits as to whether the statute’s language, “Multiple 
terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively 
unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently,”
215
 re-
fers to circumstances when the federal judge sentences first.
216
  The 
revised statute should add a line to the end of § 3584(a) that states, 
“Neither a federal nor a state court may order terms to run consecutively to an-
ticipated but yet-to-be-imposed sentences by other federal or state courts.”  This 
additional language would clarify that a judge cannot order a sen-
tence to run consecutively to anticipated sentences but rather only to 
sentences that have already been imposed or that the defendant is 
serving at that time.  Following this amendment, a provision should 
be added that states, 
A court may order terms to run concurrently to anticipated but yet-to-be-
imposed sentences by other federal courts or state courts so long as the de-
fendant is already charged with the offenses for which the sentence will run 
concurrently, or these offenses were committed prior to sentencing and are 
known to the court at the time of sentencing.  When a federal or state court 
judge orders its sentence to be served concurrently, the sentence will run 
concurrently with any undischarged sentence, pending sentence, or sen-
tence for an offense committed by the defendant and known to the court at 
the time of sentencing for which the defendant has not yet been sen-
tenced.
217
 
 
 214 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2006).  Goffette similarly suggests a revision to this statute 
to clarify ambiguity and provide that a federal court may not prospectively bind a fu-
ture sentencing court.   Goffette, supra note 163, at 1092.  The proposed revisions to 
the statute in this Comment would have the same effect when the federal judge sen-
tencing first tries to order consecutive sentences, but would expressly allow a federal 
court sentencing first to order concurrent sentences. 
 215 § 3584(a). 
 216 See supra Part II.A.  
 217 Section 3584(a) would therefore read, 
Imposition of concurrent or consecutive terms. If multiple terms of 
imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time, or if a 
term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already sub-
ject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run con-
currently or consecutively, except that the terms may not run consecu-
tively for an attempt and for another offense that was the sole objective 
of the attempt. Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same 
time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates 
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This additional language would clarify that a federal judge does have 
both the power and the authority to prospectively order concurrent 
sentences but only as to those offenses against any sovereign that are 
known to the federal judge at the time of sentencing. 
The next step would be to revise §§ 3621(a)
218
 and 3585.
219
  These 
revisions would require the BOP to follow the concurrency determi-
nation of either the state or the federal government regardless of the 
order of sentencing.
220
  If the state has primary jurisdiction and orders 
a concurrent sentence, regardless of the sentencing order, the BOP, 
upon receiving the defendant for service of the federal sentence after 
service of the state sentence, would either credit the defendant with 
the appropriate time served in state custody toward the federal sen-
tence or would release the defendant if the defendant has satisfied 
the length of his concurrent federal sentence.  If the state has sec-
ondary jurisdiction, the BOP would turn the defendant over to the 
state department of corrections after the defendant has served the 
length of the federal sentence to effectuate the concurrent sentence 
 
that the terms are to run consecutively. Multiple terms of imprison-
ment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court or-
ders that the terms are to run concurrently.  Neither a federal nor a state 
court may order terms to run consecutively to anticipated but yet-to-be-imposed 
sentences by other federal or state courts.  A court may order terms to run concur-
rently to anticipated but yet-to-be-imposed sentences by other federal courts or state 
courts so long as the defendant is already charged with the offenses for which the 
sentence will run concurrently, or these offenses were committed prior to sentenc-
ing and are known to the court at the time of sentencing.  When a  federal or 
state court judge orders its sentence to be served concurrently, the sentence will 
run concurrently with any undischarged sentence, pending sentence, or sentence 
for an offense committed by the defendant and known to the court at the time of 
sentencing for which the defendant has not yet been sentenced. 
 218 § 3621(a).  The section currently reads, 
Commitment to custody of Bureau of Prisons. A person who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of 
subchapter D of chapter 227 [18 U.S.C. §§ 3581 et seq.] shall be com-
mitted to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of 
the term imposed, or until earlier released for satisfactory behavior 
pursuant to the provisions of section 3624 [18 U.S.C. § 3624]. 
Id.  Goffette likewise recommends revising the Bureau of Prisons’ designation and 
credit authority; however, her revision is to a program statement rather than the sta-
tutes.  Goffette, supra note 163, at 1094–96.  She states, “BOP Program Statement 
5160.04(9)(e) should be amended to eliminate discretion and to require that the 
state sentence be honored.”  Id. at 1094. 
 219 § 3585. 
 220 This may require procedures for the BOP to access to the order of the state 
judge in a timely manner.  This Comment does not attempt to lay out these proce-
dures. 
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of the state judge.  The state would ensure this result by appropriately 
crediting the defendant with the time served in federal custody.
221
 
Under the revised sentencing scheme, if a federal or state judge 
orders concurrent sentences and the defendant serves the federal 
sentence second, the BOP would be required to credit the defendant 
with the time served in the state institution.
222
  In addition, if neither 
judge orders concurrent sentences and the court that sentences 
second, state or federal, orders consecutive sentences, the BOP 
should take the defendant into custody for the full length of the fed-
eral sentence.  If neither court orders concurrent sentences and the 
court that sentences second, either state or federal, is silent on 
whether the sentences should be served concurrently or consecutive-
ly, the BOP should follow the presumptions of § 3584(a).
223
 
 In order to effectuate this, a subsection (c) should be added to 
18 U.S.C. § 3585 that states: 
(c) Concurrency determination of State and Federal Sentences.  If either a 
federal or state court sentences the defendant to concurrent sentences, the 
Bureau of Prisons will credit the defendant appropriately for time served 
for another sovereign when taking the defendant into custody.  If neither a 
state nor a federal court ordered concurrent sentences, the Bureau of Pris-
ons will follow the sentencing determination of the second sentencing court 
if it ordered consecutive sentences.  If neither a state nor federal court or-
dered concurrent sentences and the second sentencing court was silent on 
whether the sentences are served concurrently or consecutively, the Bureau 
of Prisons will follow the presumptions of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).
224
 
 
 221 Some jurisdictions have sentencing laws that provide procedures for crediting 
the defendant with service of his state sentence in a federal institution.  See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. § 921.16(2) (LEXIS through 2011 Act 141); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-6 
(LEXIS through 2011 Act 97-225).  
 222 The BOP cannot ignore the sentence instruction of its own sovereign.  Not on-
ly will the revision to § 3621(b) help to enforce this, but the federal habeas statute 
will help to effectuate this.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006). 
 223 Section 3584(a) creates the presumption that “[m]ultiple terms of imprison-
ment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the sta-
tute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively.  Multiple terms of imprison-
ment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the 
terms are to run concurrently.”  § 3584(a). 
 224 Section 3585 will then read:  
Calculation of a term of imprisonment  
(a) Commencement of sentence. A sentence to a term of imprison-
ment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody 
awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service 
of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to 
be served. 
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Additionally, the following should be added to § 3621(a): “The 
length of the term of imprisonment will be calculated in accordance with the 
guidelines in 18 U.S.C. § 3585.”
225
 
What these revisions to the federal statutes would do is displace 
certain notions of primary jurisdiction, which carry too much weight 
when the defendant is subject to both state and federal sentences.  
Notions of primary jurisdiction would remain intact in that they 
would govern what they are designed to govern: the exercise of each 
sovereign’s jurisdiction over a defendant;
226
 these notions, however, 
will no longer govern the effectuation of consecutive or concurrent 
sentences between the state and federal governments.  Rather, the 
defendant would always serve a concurrent sentence if either judge 
orders it regardless of the order of service or the order of sentencing.  
In this way, the federal government would no longer be able to force 
a defendant to serve consecutive sentences when a state judge has or-
dered concurrent sentences.
227
  This would promote the effectiveness 
of plea agreements, which are important for enhancing efficiency 
 
(b) Credit for prior custody. A defendant shall be given credit toward 
the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in offi-
cial detention prior to the date the sentence commences— 
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; 
or 
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was ar-
rested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence 
was imposed;  
that has not been credited against another sentence. 
(c) Concurrency determination of State and Federal Sentences.  If either a federal 
or state court sentences the defendant to concurrent sentences, the Bureau of 
Prisons will credit the defendant appropriately for time served for another sove-
reign when taking the defendant into custody.  If neither a state nor a federal 
court ordered concurrent sentences, the Bureau of Prisons will follow the sentenc-
ing determination of the second sentencing court if it ordered consecutive sen-
tences.  If neither a state nor federal court ordered concurrent sentences and the 
second sentencing court was silent on whether the sentences are served concur-
rently or consecutively, the Bureau of Prisons  will follow the presumptions of 18 
U.S.C. § 3584(a). 
 225 Section 3621(a) will then read: 
Commitment to custody of Bureau of Prisons. A person who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of 
subchapter D of chapter 227 [18 U.S.C. §§ 3581 et seq.] shall be com-
mitted to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of 
the term imposed, or until earlier released for satisfactory behavior 
pursuant to the provisions of section 3624 [18 U.S.C. § 3624].  The 
length of the term of imprisonment will be calculated in accordance with the 
guidelines in 18 U.S.C. § 3585. 
 226 See supra Part II.C.  
 227 See supra Part II. 
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and quick dispute resolution in the criminal justice system.
228
  And 
perhaps most importantly, these revisions would force both sove-
reigns to recognize each other’s sentencing authority. 
B. Constitutional Authority for the Creation of the Rule that Sentences 
Must be Served Concurrently if Either Sovereign Orders Concurrent 
Sentences 
The federal criminal justice system is required to follow the laws 
of the federal government, and therefore federal authorities would 
have to abide by the revisions to §§ 3621(a), 3584(a), and 3585.  
Some consideration must be given to how the federal government 
can constitutionally require state governments to follow these same 
revisions.  Congress cannot commandeer state legislatures and re-
quire them to incorporate the new rule in their laws,
229
 but states 
cannot violate valid federal laws.
230
  It would be inefficient and ex-
tremely difficult to get all states to agree to the new rule.
231
  This fact 
stems from the nature of dual sovereignty.  The federal government 
has the power to require states to follow the revisions to § 3584(a)  
because the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution allows 
Congress to create laws that are necessary and proper to the carrying 
out the constitutionally enumerated powers of the United States gov-
ernment.
232
  The proposed amendment to § 3584(a)—that the sen-
tences must be served concurrently if either judge orders concurrent 
sentences—would be useless if the federal government did not have 
the power to exact state compliance.  The Supreme Court has stated 
that Congress does not exceed its power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause when it enacts laws that are “conducive to the due ad-
ministration of justice” and are based on Congress’s constitutionally 
granted powers.
233
  The Necessary and Proper Clause is therefore tied 
to the legitimacy of federal jurisdiction, and laws enacted pursuant to 
 
 228 See supra Part III.B. 
 229 See supra notes 172 and 175 and accompanying text. 
 230 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913, 928–29 (1997) (stating that state 
officials cannot obstruct operation of federal law and state courts cannot refuse to 
apply federal law). 
 231 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 232 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (“[Congress has the power t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the Unit-
ed States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).  Federal habeas power stems 
from this clause, and federal courts can use the habeas power to enforce the rule that 
if either sovereign wishes its sentences to be served concurrently, the sentences will 
be served concurrently regardless of the sentencing order.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 233 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 417 (1819). 
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the clause must aid the administration of justice and relate to a fed-
erally granted power.  The powers granted to Congress under the 
Constitution include, inter alia, the commerce power,
234
 the postal 
power,
235
 and the power to create courts below the Supreme Court.
236
  
These powers allow Congress to create certain federal criminal sta-
tutes and allow Congress to give federal courts the power to hear 
such claims, through federal question jurisdiction
237
 or jurisdiction 
over claims when the United States is a party.
238
  When Congress 
enacts a law that is necessary and proper to the carrying into execu-
tion one of these constitutionally enumerated powers, states are re-
quired to abide by the valid federal law.
239
 
For example, the Supreme Court in Jinks v. Richland County 
upheld the constitutionality of the federal supplemental jurisdiction 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
240
  Section 1367(d) tolls the limitations 
period in state courts for state law claims over which a federal court 
exercises supplemental jurisdiction so that if the federal court de-
clines to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim, the claim 
would not be time-barred in state court.
241
  The Court explained that 
the statute was appropriate under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
because it “promote[d] fair and efficient operation of the federal 
courts” by allowing a federal court to decide whether to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction without a concern for the repercussions that 
the plaintiff would face if the federal court dismissed the state law 
claim.
242
  Congress has the constitutional power to create lower feder-
al courts under Article I, § 8, clause 9 and thus has the power under 
Article I, § 8, clause 18 to create laws that are necessary and proper 
 
 234 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 235 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 236 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 237 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
 238 §§ 1345–1346. 
 239 Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 913, 928–29 (1997) (stating that state 
officials cannot obstruct operation of federal law and state courts cannot refuse to 
apply federal law). 
 240 538 U.S. 456 (2003).  28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2006) provides: 
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), 
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed 
at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection 
(a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling 
period. 
§ 1367(d). 
 241 Jinks, 538 U.S. at 459. 
 242 Id. at 463. 
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for the fair and efficient administration of these courts.  The constitu-
tionality of the supplemental jurisdiction statute in Jinks was linked to 
the legitimacy of federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause and congressional power to create lower federal courts 
in the first place.
243
  By analogy to Jinks, it is necessary and proper for 
states to abide by the rule that sentences will be served concurrently if 
any sovereign orders concurrent sentences in order to promote the 
fair and efficient administration of the federal courts—courts which 
were created pursuant to Congress’s constitutionally granted authori-
ty under Article I, § 8, clause 9.  For these reasons, Congress has the 
constitutional authority to make the proposed revisions to §§ 
3621(a), 3584(a), and 3585, and states would be required to follow 
these valid federal laws. 
C. Use of Federal Habeas Statutes for Enforcement 
A further check on the ability of the federal government to ig-
nore a state’s concurrency order could be the federal habeas statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
244
  This statute permits a prisoner who claims some 
defect in his federal incarceration to file a habeas petition in federal 
court.
245
  Under the revisions of §§ 3584(a), 3585, and 3621(a), the 
failure of the BOP to credit a prisoner for the time served in state 
custody
246
 would be a violation of federal law; therefore, a prisoner 
 
 243 Id. at 462–63. 
 244 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).   
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of 
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 
sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum autho-
rized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the 
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence. 
§ 2255(a). 
 245 Id. 
 246 The Bureau can designate the state institution as the place of the service of the 
federal sentence.  18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006).  
Place of imprisonment. The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place 
of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any availa-
ble penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of 
health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained 
by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without 
the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau 
determines to be appropriate and suitable . . . .  
Id.  Designating the state institution as the place of federal incarceration is one step 
in crediting the defendant for his time served in accordance with the concurrent 
sentencing order. 
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could file a federal habeas petition asking the court to order the BOP 
to credit the prisoner for the time served.
247
  This statute would apply 
regardless of whether the state or the federal government, sentencing 
first or second, ordered the concurrent sentence. 
Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, if either the state or the 
federal government orders concurrent sentences, the defendant is in 
state custody, and the state refuses to credit the defendant with the 
time served in the custody of another jurisdiction, the defendant may 
file a habeas petition.
248
  Under this statute, a defendant can chal-
lenge his incarceration in a state facility as a violation of the United 
States Constitution or federal law.  Before a defendant can take ad-
vantage of § 2254, the statute requires either that the defendant ex-
haust all of the remedies available at the state level or show that no 
such remedies exist.
249
  Refusal by the state authorities to credit the 
defendant with the time served in federal detention when a court has 
imposed a concurrent sentence upon the defendant would violate § 
3584(a) because, under the proposed changes, if any judge orders a 
concurrent sentence with any undischarged or pending sentences, 
under federal law, the sentences must be served concurrently.
250
  The 
habeas statutes, §§ 2254 and 2255, can therefore be used to enforce 
the new rule of requiring sentences to be served concurrently if a 
judge orders them to be concurrent.
251
 
 
 247 § 3621(b); see also supra Part IV.A, B.  
 248 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).  Section 2254(a) reads, 
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 
court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in be-
half of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution 
or laws or treaties of the United States. 
Id. 
 249 § 2254(b). 
 250 See supra Part IV.A. 
 251 Section 2254(d)(1) states, 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to a judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a de-
cision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 
the United States . . . . 
Id.  This may require the Supreme Court to recognize the rule advocated by this 
Comment and advanced by § 3584(a)—that if either sovereign orders concurrent 
sentences the sentences are served concurrently—before a prisoner in state custody 
is able to enforce this rule through the state habeas statute, § 2254. 
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D. The Combination of Revisions and Use of Habeas Statutes 
Effectuates Concurrent Sentences If Either Sovereign Orders 
Concurrent Sentences 
The proposed revisions of §§ 3584(a), 3621(a), and 3585 would 
result in a criminal justice system that prevents a federal judge from 
ordering that the federal sentence be served consecutively to antic-
ipated future sentences.  The BOP would always take into considera-
tion the sentences imposed by the various courts, state and federal, 
when making credit determinations to ascertain if multiple sentences 
were ordered to be served concurrently.  Secondary jurisdiction 
would no longer allow the federal government to force consecutive 
sentences when the state judge who sentences second has ordered 
concurrent sentences. 
 These revisions would promote the recognition of state author-
ity in federal courts.  Dual sovereignty and comity would be protected 
because the BOP would recognize the sentence of the state court.  
Additionally, this new rule reduces the fragmentation of authority be-
tween the state and federal governments in the criminal justice sys-
tem.  The use of the federal habeas statutes to enforce the new rule 
would eliminate the difficulties associated with getting all states to 
agree to the same procedures.  Instead, the rule would be a federal 
rule—a rule that is consistent with the basic principles underlying the 
criminal justice system and constitutional rights
252
—binding upon the 
states.  The interests of both sovereigns
253
 would be promoted because 
each sovereign would receive the sentence the sovereign ordered and 
because neither has an interest in the sentence of another sovereign.  
Under such a criminal justice system, when a sovereign orders a con-
current sentence, the sovereign would be given only what the sove-
reign deems necessary, and therefore, if either sovereign orders con-
current sentences, the sentences would be served concurrently.
254
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Under the current sentencing scheme, when the federal gov-
ernment has secondary jurisdiction but sentences first, the federal 
 
 252 See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.  
 253 This rule applies to concurrent jurisdiction between states or concurrent juris-
diction between the state and the federal governments.  This Comment focuses on 
the concurrent jurisdiction between the state and federal governments, but the poli-
cy concerns underlying the rule endorsed by this Comment—that if either sovereign 
orders concurrent sentences, the sentences will be served concurrently—are pro-
moted when this rule is applied to conflicts between states. 
 254 See supra Part III.B. 
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court can effectively ignore a state court’s determination that the 
federal and the state sentences should be served concurrently and 
can force the defendant to serve consecutive sentences instead.
255
  Be-
cause the sentence of the sovereign with secondary jurisdiction is 
served second and because the BOP has credit and designation au-
thority, the BOP may ignore the determination of state judges with 
regard to concurrent sentences, as demonstrated by the earlier dis-
cussion of the circuit split.
256
  This result poses serious problems to 
the principles of dual sovereignty and comity.  Additionally, allowing 
the federal government to ignore the state’s post-federal-sentence 
concurrency determination limits the effectiveness of plea bargains in 
reducing the workload of the courts and promoting efficiency in the 
criminal justice system.
257
 
 The proper result should be that if either sovereign, state or 
federal, wishes to impose concurrent sentences, while sentencing first 
or second, the sentences must be served concurrently both in law and 
in practice.  This would produce uniformity, predictability, and fair-
ness in the criminal justice system.
258
  The principles that underlie the 
criminal justice system favor concurrent sentences because the goal 
of sentencing is to provide punishment that is no greater than neces-
sary.  When a sovereign is forced to accept a greater sentence than 
the sovereign ordered—through the service of consecutive rather 
than concurrent sentences—the defendant’s sentence becomes 
greater than necessary for that sovereign.  When a judge orders a 
concurrent sentence after considering the totality of the defendant’s 
offenses, the judge implicitly states that the service of just one sen-
tence satisfies the defendant’s obligations to that sovereign.  Thus, a 
judge should not be compelled to accept a greater sentence than the 
judge ordered. 
 In order to implement the rule proposed in this Comment, 
Congress should amend §§ 3584(a), 3621(a), and 3585.  These 
amendments would resolve the circuit disagreement about the feder-
al judiciary’s authority to order a consecutive sentence to an antic-
ipated but yet-to-be-imposed state sentence because the amendments 
would explicitly disallow this practice.
259
  Federal judges would, how-
ever, retain the authority to order concurrent sentences whether sen-
tencing first or second.  Further, these amendments would also re-
 
 255 See supra Part II.D.2. 
 256 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 257 See supra Part III.B. 
 258 Id. 
 259 See supra notes 217–25 and accompanying text. 
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quire the BOP to take into consideration the state judge’s order with 
regard to concurrency.  If the state judge ordered concurrent sen-
tences, regardless of the sentencing order and regardless of whether 
the federal judge ordered consecutive sentences, the BOP would be 
required to credit the defendant with his time served in state custody.  
Inmates could use two federal habeas statutes, §§ 2254 and 2255, to 
petition the federal court if the inmates are effectively serving con-
secutive sentences even though a judge ordered concurrent sen-
tences.
260
  These amendments and the new rule that an order of con-
current sentences always prevails would reduce the importance of 
primary jurisdiction in the imposition of consecutive or concurrent 
sentences, would eliminate the ability of the federal government to 
ignore the sentencing authority of the states, and would transform 
the criminal justice system into a more coherent and less fragmented 
system of justice, fairness, and predictability. 
 
 260 See supra Part IV.C. 
